2.3.28.R.01. Rationale The adoption of cloud technologies will introduce a wide range of technology and information system risks inaddition to the risks that already exist for agency systems. It is vital that these additional risks are identified and assessed in order to select appropriate controls and countermeasures. 2.3.28.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:259] Agencies intending to adopt cloud services SHOULD review and enhance existing security architectures and systems design to prudently manage the changed risk, technology and security environment in adopting cloud services. 2.3.29. Selection of Services 2.3.29.R.01. Rationale A number of cloud related service, contracts and other arrangements have been negotiated on behalf of the New Zealand Government with a number of cloud service providers. Agencies must consider these services before negotiating individual contracts or supply contract with cloud service providers. 2.3.29.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST [CID:4935] Agencies MUST consider the use of any All of Government contracts with cloud service providers before negotiating individual contracts. 2.3.30. System Decommissioning and Contract Termination 2.3.30.R.01. Rationale It is important that agencies understand how and where their data is processed, managed, stored, backed up and archived within the cloud service provider’s environment (systems architecture). This may result in multiple copies of agency data in several data centres, possibly also in several countries. 2.3.30.R.02. Rationale When an agency system or service is decommissioned or a service provider’s contract terminated, it is important that agencies ensure data is returned to the agency and no copies are retained by the service provider. 2.3.30.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:263] Agency system architectures and supply arrangements and contracts SHOULD include provision for the safe return of agency data in the event of system or service termination or contract termination. 2.4. Preparation for Post-Quantum Cryptography Objective 2.4.1. Agencies are prepared for the impacts that widespread availability of quantum computing will have on information security. Context Scope 2.4.2. This section provides information for agencies to assist with preparation for the impacts of quantum computing on information security, and more specifically impacts related to encryption. Background 2.4.3. There has been a substantial amount of research on quantum computers – machines that exploit quantum mechanical phenomena to solve mathematical problems that are difficult or intractable for conventional computers. The pace of this research is accelerating. 2.4.4. The development of quantum computing is a rapidly advancing area with multiple innovations being announced regularly, often eclipsing previous forecasts. 2.4.5. Quantum computers are not expected to fully replace classical computers as quantum effects are currently useful only on particular tasks. However quantum computers will be able to rapidly solve highly complex problems, well beyond the capabilities of today’s supercomputers. 2.4.6. A prominent area of quantum computing applicability is in the field of cryptanalysis, and it is expected that they will be able to compromise or render ineffective many of the public-key cryptosystems currently in use. 2.4.7. It is important that agencies are aware of the potential impact developments in quantum computing are likely to have on critical security controls such as encryption. It is also important that they are preparing to act to minimise the disruptions that could be caused during migrations to post-quantum cryptography (cryptographic systems that remain secure after the widespread availability of quantum computing). 2.4.8. Currently there are no post-quantum cryptographic systems approved for use in the NZISM, however there are actions that agencies can undertake to prepare for the time when such systems are approved. Post-Quantum Cryptographic Standards 2.4.9. International organisations are evaluating potential candidates for standardisation in post-quantum cryptography. GCSB will review applicable standards and consider them for incorporation into the NZISM when they are published. 2.4.10. When standards for quantum-resistant public key cryptography become available, GCSB may deprecate or withdraw support for existing classical cryptographic standards. Agencies should therefore be prepared to transition away from these algorithms possibly in the next 2-3 years, even though the standards to migrate to are still to be developed. 2.4.11. Until new quantum-resistant algorithms are standardised, agencies should maintain or strengthen their existing cryptographic position using the algorithms, protocols and key lengths specified in Chapter 17 of the NZISM. References 2.4.12. Additional guidance on post-quantum cryptography can be found at: 18 Version_3.5__January-2022

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