Cybersecurity guide for developing countries
The expanding use of biometric technology raises numerous issues of an ethical and ergonomic, not to
mention economic, legal and technological, nature. Such issues include:
–
the confidentiality of biometric data which may be considered private;
–
cases in which biometric data may not be unique (identical twins);
–
the fact that biometric data sensors are often seen as intrusive and are rejected by the majority
of users in cases where a choice is available. They also constitute a threat to the freedom of the
individual, e.g. a large number of sensors, such as video cameras, set up in public locations
and operating without people’s knowledge;
–
cases of identity theft or of improper or fraudulent use of biometric data.
Given their lack of precision and continuing high purchase, deployment and operational costs, access
control solutions based on the use of biometric data are not in mainstream use.
Summary of the limitations encountered when using biometric data for access control:
1
Biometric data used in the identification of an individual will vary through time.
2
Biometric data have to be captured and converted into a reference sample for storage in a
database. As they are digitized, the data become fragile (and hence modifiable), and must
therefore be accorded the best possible protection. For each access request, the user’s
biometric data must be captured; this raises the problem of acceptance of the capture method
and associated feeling of intrusion that is in many cases unwelcome.
3
Access control based on biometric data is not 100 per cent failsafe owing to the variability of
the human sample to be analysed during the authentication process. According to the system
in use, the probability of false positive or false negative identification can be relatively high
and will depend on the technology used to record the biometric data and quality of the
operation.
III.2.9
III.2.9.1
Protection and management of communication infrastructures
Protection
The physical layer (layer 1) can contribute to the security of transmissions by producing line
scrambling, i.e. by transmitting non-significant information in order to mask a flow of relevant data
within an uninterrupted flow of unimportant data. However, were it necessary to protect transmissions
against passive eavesdropping through capture of the electromagnetic radiation induced by the signal
carried via the transmission media, the latter would have to be fully isolated in Faraday cages. Clearly,
such a protection measure will be implemented only where absolutely necessary.
The physical security of transmission media, splice boxes and connection equipment must be properly
set up and maintained.
The transmission infrastructure has to be protected against any form of radiation that could
compromise the data transmission process, and against passive (data snooping) or active
(modification, destruction or creation of data) attacks.
Knowing how to protect user connections is of paramount importance. To this end, they have to be
identified (who are the users?), located (where are they?) and their requirements identified (what are
the application flows being carried?). By responding to the general question “who does what and
where?”, one can identify the various security requirements pertaining to the transport network.
Securing the transfer of data comes down to integrating the security process within the communication
infrastructure, which must therefore be capable of assimilating that process in its entirety. This more
often than not requires the updating of all of the routers – a situation which can in some cases lead to
problems of router interoperability and change management.
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