PR OLIFE R AT ION
to engage smaller point targets such as bunkers. In Russia, this development took
place around a decade later. China now has the same – and in some areas even
more advanced – capabilities.
Technological development and the rise of China have thus led to a situation
where an instrument of strategic arms control between two contracting states suddenly obstructs the development of new core competencies of the conventional
armed forces in these – but only in these – contracting states, namely the engagement of high-value point targets using conventional standoff weapons. As a traditional naval power with a superior air force, the USA has, thanks to its air-based and
sea-based resources, been able to cope with this ‘collateral damage from the past’
more readily than Russia with its powerful land forces. However, it was foreseeable
that both states would look, within the framework of their policies, for ways out of
this impasse.
The consensus on banning horizontal proliferation is under pressure politically
– even if only a few countries are openly speaking out against it. Nonetheless, it
will probably prevail. Vertical proliferation, on the other hand, is under constant
pressure from technological development and new geopolitical realities. Its control mechanisms must therefore be renewed periodically to take account of the
current status of cutting-edge technology and its spread around the globe. The
end of the INF Treaty thus also holds out the possibility of a global system of arms
control that is more appropriate to the times.
SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 9 | FIS
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