PR OLIFE R AT ION to engage smaller point targets such as bunkers. In Russia, this development took place around a decade later. China now has the same – and in some areas even more advanced – capabilities. Technological development and the rise of China have thus led to a situation where an instrument of strategic arms control between two contracting states suddenly obstructs the development of new core competencies of the conventional armed forces in these – but only in these – contracting states, namely the engagement of high-value point targets using conventional standoff weapons. As a traditional naval power with a superior air force, the USA has, thanks to its air-based and sea-based resources, been able to cope with this ‘collateral damage from the past’ more readily than Russia with its powerful land forces. However, it was foreseeable that both states would look, within the framework of their policies, for ways out of this impasse. The consensus on banning horizontal proliferation is under pressure politically – even if only a few countries are openly speaking out against it. Nonetheless, it will probably prevail. Vertical proliferation, on the other hand, is under constant pressure from technological development and new geopolitical realities. Its control mechanisms must therefore be renewed periodically to take account of the current status of cutting-edge technology and its spread around the globe. The end of the INF Treaty thus also holds out the possibility of a global system of arms control that is more appropriate to the times. SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 9 | FIS 73

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