ILLE G AL INT E LLIG E NCE What does the FIS see? Motives and aims Espionage is driven by a variety of different motives and has more than one aim. For example, states strive, using information obtained by their intelligence services, to gain a fuller picture of the situation in order to improve the effectiveness of their actions. It can furthermore be observed that information is increasingly being procured with the aim of influencing (in so-called influence operations) or damaging the actions of rivals. Both can be achieved through the selective publication of information. The aim of such activities is often to weaken the cohesion of international groups or institutions and thereby to restrict their ability to act. In addition, there have recently been several cases in which states used their intelligence services – outside the scope of traditional espionage missions – for attacks on regime opponents or defectors. Methods There are various methods of gathering information covertly: in addition to sifting through and analysing openly available information and the ʻtraditional’ recruitment of human sources and acquisition of information from them, other so-called sensors have gained in importance. The latter have not, however, replaced the conventional methods. Intelligence services continue to rely on a mix of different sensors and are continuously developing these. Espionage operations which have come to light reveal that cyber tools and other communications reconnaissance instruments are being used in parallel and in interaction with human sources. Depending on the objective, information is also being procured exclusively via cyberspace. The latter has gained in importance insofar as the use of cyber-based information-gathering tools has proven successful for many actors. Cyber espionage is difficult to detect, the perpetrators can hardly be successfully prosecuted, as the purported country of origin does of course not help to elucidate the affair and determination by the means of intelligence of the origins of the cyber-attack (ʻattributionʼ) can simply be denied based on the lack of provability. Switzerland as a target Switzerland is affected by these developments in many ways: Swiss authorities, international organisations based in this country and Swiss companies are themselves the target of reconnaissance activity by intelligence services. So-called third-country meetings, i.e. meetings between members of foreign intelligence services and their SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 9 | FIS 77

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