ILLE G AL INT E LLIG E NCE
What does the FIS see?
Motives and aims
Espionage is driven by a variety of different motives and has more than one aim.
For example, states strive, using information obtained by their intelligence services,
to gain a fuller picture of the situation in order to improve the effectiveness of their
actions. It can furthermore be observed that information is increasingly being procured with the aim of influencing (in so-called influence operations) or damaging
the actions of rivals. Both can be achieved through the selective publication of information. The aim of such activities is often to weaken the cohesion of international
groups or institutions and thereby to restrict their ability to act. In addition, there
have recently been several cases in which states used their intelligence services –
outside the scope of traditional espionage missions – for attacks on regime opponents or defectors.
Methods
There are various methods of gathering information covertly: in addition to sifting
through and analysing openly available information and the ʻtraditional’ recruitment
of human sources and acquisition of information from them, other so-called sensors
have gained in importance. The latter have not, however, replaced the conventional
methods. Intelligence services continue to rely on a mix of different sensors and are
continuously developing these.
Espionage operations which have come to light reveal that cyber tools and other
communications reconnaissance instruments are being used in parallel and in interaction with human sources. Depending on the objective, information is also being
procured exclusively via cyberspace. The latter has gained in importance insofar
as the use of cyber-based information-gathering tools has proven successful for
many actors. Cyber espionage is difficult to detect, the perpetrators can hardly
be successfully prosecuted, as the purported country of origin does of course not
help to elucidate the affair and determination by the means of intelligence of the
origins of the cyber-attack (ʻattributionʼ) can simply be denied based on the lack
of provability.
Switzerland as a target
Switzerland is affected by these developments in many ways: Swiss authorities,
international organisations based in this country and Swiss companies are themselves
the target of reconnaissance activity by intelligence services. So-called third-country
meetings, i.e. meetings between members of foreign intelligence services and their
SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 9 | FIS
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