I LLE GAL I N T E L L I G E N C E
Protection of critical infrastructure
Targeted attacks on industrial control systems | The Triton/Trisis malware is
designed to manipulate systems monitoring industrial control systems in such a
way that faulty behaviour goes undetected. Until now, attacks have been focussed
directly on the plant control systems. A safety control system monitors and controls the operation of a plant. If, for example, the pressure or the temperature of
the process being monitored exceeds a critical value, alarms are triggered, countermeasures are initiated automatically or the system is shut down. If such systems
are successfully manipulated, a plant may be damaged or even destroyed as a
result. Triton/Trisis is only the fifth known malware that is specifically directed at
industrial control systems. The best-known malware in this context is Stuxnet. The
malware which was used to attack the power supply in Ukraine in December 2015
and in 2016 falls into the same category.
Such attacks have until now been deployed with a great deal of restraint; to
date, the use of acts of sabotage has primarily been limited to war-like or strategic
conflicts. The restraint is probably linked to the fact that such operations run the
risk of causing uncontrollable collateral damage, which also entails incalculable
consequences for the attacker. Such attacks are therefore generally aimed in a very
targeted manner against a specific system configuration, and they are correspondingly costly. Typically, only state actors are capable of going to such lengths.
In addition to this, industrial control systems and their operators are increasingly
being spied on, possibly in order to gain an overview of ways in which they could
be manipulated and in order to be prepared for future political developments. For
example, the Dragonfly group, which targets the energy sector, has been observed
to engage in such activities.
Risks imported with ICT components | Hardware and software manufacturers
from certain states have been in the spotlight, and not just since the Snowden revelations. Soon after the Chinese manufacturer Huawei entered the global market,
doubts were raised, particularly in a number of Western states, about the integrity
of its products and the company’s independence from the Chinese authorities. The
Snowden leaks in 2013 confirmed, at least in part, the suspicion that US manufacturers like Cisco, Microsoft or Google were also giving the authorities access to
their products.
Actions are being taken to deal with the issue of states potentially having access
to and control over ICT manufacturers based in them. The measures currently
being taken are aimed in the broadest sense at manufacturers and suppliers of
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