KE Y FIG UR E S
Cable reconnaissance | The Intelligence Service Act has also given the FIS the
powers to conduct cable reconnaissance in order to gather information about security relevant incidents abroad (Article 39 ff. ISA). As the purpose of cable reconnaissance is to gather information about other countries, it is not designed to be used as
a domestic intelligence-gathering measure requiring authorisation. However, cable
reconnaissance can be carried out only where Swiss telecommunications service
providers are required to forward relevant data flows to the Swiss Army’s Centre for
Electronic Operations. The ISA therefore provides under Article 40 f. an authorisation and approval procedure for orders to the providers, which is similar to that for
intelligence-gathering measures requiring authorisation. In 2018, one cable reconnaissance order was issued.
Radio reconnaissance | Radio reconnaissance is also targeted at foreign countries (Article 38 ISA), which means that only radio systems located abroad may
be recorded. In practice, this concerns primarily telecommunication satellites and
short-wave transmitters. In contrast to cable reconnaissance, radio reconnaissance
is not subject to authorisation, because in radio reconnaissance, it is not necessary
to oblige telecommunications service providers to reroute data. In 2018, 31 radio
reconnaissance orders were issued.
Immigration checks | In 2018, the FIS screened 5,443 immigration applications for
threats to internal security (accreditation of diplomats and international officials or
visa applications and applications for work and residence permits required under the
law on foreign nationals). The FIS recommended the refusal of four applications for
accreditation, of three visa applications and of four applications for residence permits. The FIS also screened 5,333 asylum dossiers for threats to the internal security
of Switzerland. In 21 cases it either recommended refusal of the asylum application
based on relevant security concerns or it pointed to a security risk. Of the 49,168
applications for naturalisation screened by the FIS in accordance with the ISA, it
recommended refusal of the naturalisation application or raised security concerns
in 5 cases. As part of the Schengen visa consultation procedure called ʻVisionʼ, the
FIS screened 900,880 data records for any threat to Switzerland’s internal security.
It recommended the refusal of 4 visa applications. The FIS also submitted applications to fedpol for the order of 101 entry bans (86 were ordered, 15 were still being
processed at the year end) and 1 expulsion (being processed). In addition, the FIS
screened the API (Advance Passenger Information) data for 1,748,930 individuals
SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 9 | FIS
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