A/76/136 4.1 Attribution under international law A State may be held responsible under international law for cyber operations conducted by an organ of the State or by actors exercising governmental authority on behalf of the State. 192 A State may be held responsible under international law for cyber operations conducted by non-State actors if these are conducted on the direct instructions of the State or under its direction or effective control. 193 It may be technically challenging to establish that a relationship between a State and a non-State actor amounts to direct instructions, direction or effective control. However, this is a question of evidence, and not of lack of clarity of international law. 4.2 Due diligence Furthermore, a State may be held responsible under international law if it knows or should have known that cyber operations that target third States are being carried out from or via its territory, and fails to take adequate measures. 194 As a consequence of the right to exercise sovereignty over cyber infrastructure located on its territory, States also have a corresponding obligation not to knowingly allow their territory to be used for acts causing significant harm to the rights of other States under international law. This customary international law obligation, often referred to as the due diligence principle, was recognised by the ICJ in the 1949 Corfu Channel judgment, 195 and is reflected in numerous rules in specialised regimes of international law. Norway is of the view that the due diligence obligation applies in situations where there is a risk of transboundary harm from hazardous activities, regardless of the nature of the activity, and accordingly also applies to cyber operations. Accordingly, if a State possesses knowledge of a cyber operation being carried out from or via its territory causing serious adverse consequences with respect to a right of the target State under international law, it is required to take adequate measures to address the situation. The due diligence standard is the conduct that is generally considered to be appropriate and proportional to the degree of risk of transboundary harm in the particular instance. It is an obligation of conduct, not of result. Applied to cyber activities, what is required is for the State to take all reasonably available measures to terminate the cyber operation. A breach of the obligation consists not of failing to achieve the desired result, but of failing to take the necessary, diligent steps towards that end. It is irrelevant whether the cyber operation in question is conducted by a third State or a non-State actor. Likewise, it is irrelevant whether the cyber operation in question is conducted by an actor physically present on the State’s territory or by an actor making remote use of ICT infrastructure on the State’s territory. In addition to actual knowledge of the use of cyber infrastructure within its territory for harmful cyber operations against another State, a State may also violate its due diligence obligation if it is in fact unaware of the activities in question but objectively should have known about them and fails to address the situation. 196 Accordingly, knowledge also encompasses those situations in which a State in the __________________ 192 193 194 195 196 21-09670 Cf. ILC ASR, in particular Articles 4, 5 and 7. See Article 8 ILC ASR. See also Nicaragua judgment, para 115, and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ, judgment 27 February 2007, para. 400. See Article 2 ILC ASR, which explicitly states that a State’s conduct may consist of ‘an action or omission’. See also Corfu Channel, ICJ, judgment 9 April 1949, p. 18. Corfu Channel judgment, 9 April 1949, p. 22 Corfu Channel judgment, 9 April 1949, p. 18. 71/142

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