A/76/136 cyber operation or internationally wrongful act can be attributed. There is no requirement for countermeasures to be of the same nature as the internationally wrongful acts to which they are a response, and countermeasures in response to cyber operations may therefore be carried out within or outside cyberspace. Countermeasures must not violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force or international humanitarian law. The State held responsible should be notified of both the violation of international law and the grounds for attribution, as well as of the intention to introduce countermeasures. 201 Countermeasures may only be taken if a State has sufficient grounds for attributing the conduct in question to a particular State under international law. What constitutes sufficient grounds will be fact-specific and casespecific, and can be particularly challenging to determine in the case of cyber operations. The State taking countermeasures must be confident in its attribution before resorting to countermeasures. However, the State taking countermeasures need not publish detailed grounds for its attribution or give a detailed technical account of this to the State identified as responsible as this might reveal sensitive methods of interception and detection or offensive and defensive capabilities. Countermeasures may be taken without prior notification to the responsible State if providing such notification might reveal sensitive methods or capabilities or prevent the countermeasures from having the necessary effect. For example, the injured State could carry out a cyber operation to disrupt the capability of the aggressor State conducting the internationally wrongful cyber operation such as election interference. This countermeasure would in other circumstances be in violation of the aggressor State’s sovereignty. 5.3 Necessity In a situation of necessity, a State may be able to respond to a cyber operation in a way that is in principle in breach of an international obligation and nevertheless not incur responsibility for its actions under international law. Necessity refers to those exceptional situations where the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and imminent peril, whether cyber in nature or not, is by temporary non-compliance with international obligations of lesser weight or urgency. For instance, if infrastructure in a third country is used in an internationally wrongful cyber operation, the injured State may under certain conditions launch a cyber operation to destroy or disrupt the internationally wrongful cyber operation, even if this violates the territorial sovereignty of the third State. It is not a requirement that the preceding cyber operation must be attributable to a particular State. It should be emphasised that, according to customary law on state responsibility, a number of conditions must be fulfilled before necessity can be invoked as a ground for precluding wrongfulness. 202 5.4 Self-defence A State that is the victim of a cyber operation that qualifies as an armed attack under international law, may exercise its inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. __________________ 201 202 21-09670 ILC ASR Articles 43 and 52. See Article 25 ILC ASR. 73/142

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