A/76/136
The principle of sovereignty encompasses cyber infrastructure located in a
State’s territory irrespective of whether it is governmental or private.
Similarly, a cyber operation that interferes with or usurps the inherently
governmental functions of another State may constitute a violation of
sovereignty. 179
This is based on the premise that a State enjoys the exclusive right to exercise
within its territory, ‘to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State’. 180
Accordingly, what matters is not whether physical damage, injury, or loss of
functionality has resulted, but whether the cyber operation has interfered with data or
services that are necessary for the exercise of inherently governmental functions.
Cases in point would include altering or deleting data or blocking digital
communication between public bodies and citizens so as to interfere with the delivery
of social services, the conduct of elections, the collection of taxes, or the performance
of key national defence activities. Another example could be the manipulation of
police communications so that patrol cars are unable to communicate with police
dispatch/operation centres. In this context it is irrelevant whether the inherently
governmental function is performed by central, regional or local governments and
authorities, or by non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by
such governments or authorities. Conducting elections is a clear example of an
inherently governmental function. In contrast to the case of a cyber operation in
breach of the prohibition of intervention, there is no requirement for the interference
to reach to the level of coercion.
The precise threshold of what constitute a cyber operation in violation of
sovereignty is not settled in international law, and will depend on a case-by-case
assessment.
3.2
The prohibition of intervention
Key message:
Cyber operations that compel the target State to take a course of action,
whether by act or omission, in a way that it would not otherwise voluntarily
have pursued (coercion) in matters relating to its internal or external affairs
(domaine réservé), will constitute an intervention in violation of international
law.
The prohibition of intervention applies to a State’s cyber operations as it does
to other State activities. 181 Accordingly, a State must not carry out cyber operations
in breach of the prohibition of intervention, according to customary international
law. 182
A cyber operation must therefore not be carried out to compel the target State to
take a course of action, whether by act or omission, in a way that it would not
otherwise voluntarily have pursued (coercion) in matters relating to its internal or
external affairs (domaine réservé) – such as a State’s political, economic, social or
__________________
179
180
181
182
68/142
See Tallinn Manual 2.0, commentary to Rule 4, p. 21-22, paras. 15–16.
Island of Palmas arbitral award, p. 838.
Norway recognises that no State seems to object to the application of the prohibition on intervention
(or rule of non-intervention) in the cyber context. Reference is made to the GGE 2015 report, para. 26
and 28(b), subsequently endorsed by the GA. However, Norway is aware that there are differences of
opinion as to where the threshold for breach lies.
Nicaragua judgment, para. 202.
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