In spite of the shortcomings mentioned earlier, participants perceived the legislation in
respect to cybersecurity as sufficient. However, the government still has to fulfil its
commitment, expressed in the national ICT Security Policy from 2015, to update its legislation
“[to] reflect the international demands and obligations the country undertakes regarding
cyber security and the protection of personal data”.88 There are several gaps in existing
legislation. Furthermore, the protection of infrastructure is limited to e-communications
infrastructure and does not cover other CNI. With the NIS Directive to take effect in May 2018,
several participants emphasized the need to address this lack of legislation protecting CNI,
and criticized the slow process encountered in preparing its implementation. However, they
anticipated its potential contribution towards closing the existing gaps in CNI protection in
the very near future. Participants also expressed concerns about the state of preparedness
of the private sector and of government institutions to implement the GDPR and the
structures and processes it requires in the remaining months before it comes into effect from
May 2018 onwards. From their perspective, efforts in the remaining time should focus on
preparing the new legislation needed to implement the GDPR and putting it forth, but also
foster the implementation across the private and public sectors.
D4.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
This factor studies the capacity of law enforcement to investigate cybercrime, and the
prosecution’s capacity to present cybercrime and electronic evidence cases. Finally, this
factor addresses the court capacity to preside over cybercrime cases and those involving
electronic evidence.
Maturity Stage: Formative
Across the criminal justice system, capacities are at initial stages of development in Iceland.
The Police, headed by the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police (NCIP), have only
limited digital forensics capacity and cases are investigated by the digital forensics unit of the
Reykjavik Metropolitan Police. Two policemen at the Metropolitan Police are also specifically
assigned to investigate cases involving sexual violence against children on the internet.
However, the country needs more skilled personnel as well as the procedural and
technological resources to conduct investigations in a comprehensive way. Training for law
enforcement officers on cybercrime and digital evidence is ad-hoc or not specialized. As a
result, for instance, revenge porn is a recurring issue, because the lack of capacity hinders the
police being able to tackle all cases. One way to mitigate these threats and resource gaps is
regional and bilateral collaboration mechanisms, e.g. with the Norwegian police (see 4.3).
Some specialised cybercrime prosecutors have the capacity to build cases on electronic
evidence, but this capacity is limited as training is largely ad-hoc, not institutionalised and
informal. For instance, some prosecutors have participated in courses offered by the
88
https://joinup.ec.europa.eu/community/epractice/news/iceland-boosts-ict-security-measures-shares-policy
53 | Cybersecurity Capacity Review Iceland, 2017
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