A/76/136 control is high. A financial contribution to the activities of a non-state actor, for example, is not sufficient. In order to attribute a cyber operation it is not required that a state disclose the underlying evidence. Evidence in the legal sense becomes relevant only if legal proceedings are instituted. A state that takes countermeasures or relies on its inherent right of self-defence (see below) in response to a cyber operation may eventually have to render account for its actions, for example if the matter is brought before the International Court of Justice. In such a situation, it must be possible to provide evidence justifying the countermeasure or the exercise of the right of self-defence. This can include both information obtained through regular channels and intelligence. Under international law there is no fixed standard concerning the burden of proof a state must meet for (legal) attribution, and thus far the International Court of Justice has accepted different standards of proof. The CAVV and the AIV rightly observe as follows in this regard: ‘International law does nothave hard rules on the level of proof required but practice and case law require sufficient certainty on the origin of the attack and the identity of the author of the attack before action can be taken.’ 163 In the government’s view, the burden of proof will indeed vary in accordance with the situation, depending on the seriousness of the act considered to be in breach of international law and the intended countermeasures. States’ response options International law provides states with various options for responding to conduct by another state in cyberspace. The options available in a particular case depend on the specific circumstances. Below the government sets out the main response options available. Retorsion Retorsion relates to acts that, while unfriendly, are not in violation of international law. This option is therefore always available to states that wish to respond to undesirable conduct by another state, because it is a lawful exercise of a state’s sovereign powers. States are free to take these kinds of measures as long they remain within the bounds of their obligations under international law. A state may respond to a cyber operation by another state, for example, by declaring diplomats ‘persona non grata���, or by taking economic or other measures against individuals or entities involvedin the operation. Another retorsion measure a state may consider is limiting or cutting off the other state’s access to servers or other digital infrastructure in its territory, provided the countries in question have not concluded a treaty on mutual access to digital infrastructure in each other’s territory. Countermeasures If a state is the victim of a violation by another state of an obligation under international law (i.e. an internationally wrongful act), it may under certain 164 circumstances take countermeasures in response. Countermeasures are acts (or omissions) that would normally constitute a violation of an obligation under international law but which are permitted because they are a response to a previous violation by another state. In cyberspace, for example, a cyber operation could be launched to shut down networks or systems that another state is using for a __________________ 163 164 62/142 ‘Cyber Warfare’, No 77, AIV/ No. 22, CAVV December 2011, p. 22. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of countermeasures, see the letter of 13 April 2011 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the House of Representatives, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives, 2010/11, 32 500 V, no. 166. 21-09670

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