JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM | ASSESSMENT involving explosives or simple chemicals such as toxic gases (for example chlorine gas) require relatively few resources and little effort on the part of the perpetrators. The perpetrators do, however, need to have the appropriate expertise. Jihadists will therefore continue to be not only willing but also able to carry out both simple and more complex attacks. The FIS considers that, for the time being, the only threat likely to have been diminished by the destruction of ‘Islamic State’'s caliphate is that of complex attacks controlled and carried out directly by ‘Islamic State’. Switzerland as a possible target Switzerland is part of the Western world, classified by jihadists as Islamophobic, and thus from their point of view constitutes a legitimate target for terrorist attacks. However, in the FIS's assessment– based on jihadist propaganda and on attacks that have taken place and those that have been thwarted – the focus is more on other countries. In the event of attacks on Swiss territory, therefore, the interests of other states that are perceived by jihadists as being Islamophobic or which play a prominent role in the international fight against jihadism may also be targeted. Jewish interests may also be affected. The FIS assesses that attacks involving minimal logistical effort, carried out by individual perpetrators or small groups, are currently the most likely threat in Switzerland. In the FIS's view, the risk of copycat attacks in Switzerland will rise temporarily after each attack abroad. Such attacks will not necessarily be jihad-motivated, but may also have a different motive. The perpetrators are most likely to be individuals radicalised in Switzerland who have been inspired by jihadist propaganda and personal contacts, but who are not in direct contact with a jihadist group or organisation. These include attacks by mentally ill perpetrators whose radicalisation is more the result of their illness than of ideological conviction. Switzerland can also be used by jihadists as a logistics base for the preparation of attacks abroad or as a transit country. The most recent example of this is the itinerary followed by two people who were involved in the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in August 2017. In the areas outside Europe in which jihadist groups operate, there is still a risk that Swiss citizens might fall victim to opportunist abductions or acts of violence. Fewer jihad travellers with links to Switzerland ‘Homegrown’ jihadists radicalised in Switzerland have become more significant to the threat assessment than jihad-motivated travellers. The decline in travel to conflict zones by jihadists with links to Switzerland can be attributed to a number of factors. Reports about the harsh living conditions and ultimately the collapse of the caliphate have reduced the appeal of Syria and Iraq to jihad-motivated fighters. In addition, the enhanced countermeasures on the travel routes to Syria and Iraq have made it significantly more difficult to access the conflict area. Lastly, ‘Islamic State’'s appeals to jihadists to carry out attacks in their own country of origin or residence rather than travelling to its territory have probably also had an effect. Left: User with links to Switzerland shares a martyrdom video. SIT UAT ION R E PORT 2 0 1 8 | FIS 45

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