ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE | ASSESSMENT resources and capabilities to act either within the framework of a larger campaign or in a mostly autonomous way. In the tradition of the Soviet Union, influence operations conducted by intelligence services are referred to as ‘active measures’. The main focus is on the recruitment by the intelligence services of socalled influence agents. These are handled in the same way as sources, but are primarily used for the dissemination rather than the procurement of information. This information does not necessarily have to be false. By skilfully blending facts, false information and opinions, the desired narratives can be disseminated in a way that is tailored to requirements. The portfolio of active measures also includes the leaking of information procured using intelligence tools. This can be used, for example, to discredit undesirable persons or organisations. Allegedly leaked information may also be made up or falsified. For the work of influence agents to be effective, it usually requires coordination with other agencies, such as teams that design narratives, plan actions or distribute information themselves over the Internet. The target groups of the active measures often do not realise that they are the focus of an influence operation. Sabotage operations may, for ecample, use targeted attacks on industrial control systems. These are still rare. So far, only five malware complexes that have been specifically aimed at industrial control systems are known. Probably the most famous in this context is Stuxnet, a malware that was discovered in 2010. It was used to destroy centrifuges in uranium enrichment plants in Iran. Mention should also be made of the attacks on the power supply in 80 SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S Ukraine in December 2016, using the Crashoverride malware. This was the first incident where a malware program designed to attack a power network was actually used. However, such attacks have so far been used very conservatively. This is probably due to the fact that this type of operation always causes incalculable damage, which also makes the consequences for the attacker unpredictable. For this reason, this type of tool is used for targeted attacks on specific system configurations, which makes the attack correspondingly elaborate. The most recent example is the Triton/Trisis malware, which was aimed at the security control system of a target in the Middle East. Increasingly, industrial control systems and their operators are being spied on, possibly in order to gain an overview of ways in which they could be manipulated and to be prepared for all future eventualities. The prime example here is the attacks involving the Dragonfly 2.0 complex. At the end of June 2014, an espionage and sabotage preparation campaign called Dragonfly came to light, which was targeted at Western industrial installations and energy suppliers. The follow-up campaign, Dragonfly 2.0, was uncovered in 2017. This version also involves sending e-mails with malware attached to selected employees in the target company. In addition, the repertoire of this espionage complex once again includes targeted infections via websites and trojans. The campaign is primarily aimed at targets in the US and Europe.

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