JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM | ASSESSMENT
Travel out of the conflict area in Syria and
Iraq is not easy. In addition, most surviving
jihad travellers are aware that they will be
confronted by the law enforcement agencies,
which is why they attempt to go underground
or to travel on to third countries.
The FIS is therefore not expecting a big influx
of returning jihad travellers with links to Switzerland, but only isolated individuals. Some
jihad travellers from Switzerland have married
and have had children in the conflict area. It is
therefore to be expected that possible returnees
might bring previously unknown persons with
them, possibly including minors. This will
present new challenges to the authorities at all
levels (legal issues, problems of long-term integration and security issues). It will probably
take one or two more years until the extent of
the threat posed by returnees can be assessed in
a more precise way. The targeted exploitation
of migration flows to Europe and Switzerland
by ‘Islamic State’ or by former jihadist fighters
will also remain a real issue.
Polarisation can foster radicalisation
Jihad-motivated attacks and migration movements, particularly in 2015, have contributed
to a rise in tensions and to increased political polarisation in European societies. This is
also true in Switzerland, but to a lesser extent.
Such polarisation may exacerbate the nega-
tive feelings prevailing in parts of the Muslim
community that they are being oppressed and
marginalised, and in this way contribute to
radicalisation and increase the potential for violence. Salafist and jihadist groups are exploiting this polarisation accordingly.
Turkish-Kurdish conflict carries risks
The PKK has the capacity to stage demonstrations and other actions – including violent ones
– at short notice in response to events connected with the conflict in Kurdish areas. Violent
clashes between PKK supporters and Turkish
nationalists and/or supporters of Turkish President Erdogan currently pose the main threat in
Switzerland. Confrontations are generally the
result of direct provocation. Turkish institutions
and agencies (such as clubhouses, Turkish Airlines (THY) travel agencies and government offices), as well as centres and mosques attended
by nationalist or Islamist Turks, are all potential
PKK targets.
The present state of emergency in Turkey
means that travellers, wherever they come from,
risk being turned away or arrested on arrival if
there is even a slight suspicion of their being
PKK members or supporting terrorism. This
also applies to Gülen supporters. In addition,
there is still a heightened risk of attacks in Turkey, particularly in the major cities.
Limited significance of terrorist financing
Switzerland as a financial centre does not
play a key role in terrorist financing. Whilst
there has been an increase in the number of
transactions out of Switzerland and within
Switzerland which are suspected of being used
User with links to Switzerland shares
a propaganda image from ‘Islamic State’.
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SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S
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