ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE | OUTLOOK
O UT LO O K
The situation is likely to deteriorate
Intelligence activities will continue to be carried out in Switzerland and against Swiss interests. As already mentioned, the expansion of
individual states' endeavours to project power
will intensify these activities still further. Assuming that Switzerland maintains its current
position, economic, political and military interests will continue to be the target of intelligence
activities. In the case of some states, only their
democratisation or fundamental pacification
will cause them to refrain from exerting pressure on their own nationals abroad.
However, the description and assessment
of the situation also show that, in addition to
counterintelligence measures, prevention – and
thus the behaviour of individuals and groups –
is particularly important.
Switzerland will continue to be a prime target
of cyber attacks by states or by state-sponsored
perpetrators. Swiss interests may be directly
affected, e.g. through attacks on the federal
administration, on Swiss companies or on international organisations based in Switzerland.
However, IT infrastructures in Switzerland
may also be deliberately misused in order to
attack targets abroad.
Defensive measures
Illegal intelligence is conducted mainly on
behalf of governments, but criminal law assigns responsibility to individual persons. If
circumstances apply which are of relevance under criminal law, then these will be examined
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SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S
using instruments of criminal law. The criminal offences in question require public prosecution, i.e. no criminal complaint by a victim
is necessary, as illegal intelligence infringes
upon government interests. However, these
are defined as political offences, the criminal
investigation and prosecution of which require
authorisation by the Federal Council. If the perpetrator is a diplomat accredited in Switzerland,
the sending country would also have to lift the
diplomat's immunity. If there are not sufficient
grounds for suspicion to open criminal prosecution proceedings, or if the Federal Council
does not grant authorisation for criminal prosecution, other measures are available. For example, the withdrawal of the person engaged
in intelligence work can be achieved through
informal channels. Further options are expulsion or persona non grata declaration or, in a
case where the person is not yet in the country,
an entry ban or refusal of the necessary visa or
accreditation. These options are supplemented
by Federal Council measures – these, too, may
consist in expelling a person or prohibiting a
person from entering Switzerland.
Prevention
Despite the range of counterintelligence
measures, prevention remains one of the most
important tools for countering espionage. Besides the work of the authorities entrusted
with prevention, it consists mainly in awareness-raising and training, firstly regarding the
handling of sensitive information and secondly
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