ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE | OUTLOOK O UT LO O K The situation is likely to deteriorate Intelligence activities will continue to be carried out in Switzerland and against Swiss interests. As already mentioned, the expansion of individual states' endeavours to project power will intensify these activities still further. Assuming that Switzerland maintains its current position, economic, political and military interests will continue to be the target of intelligence activities. In the case of some states, only their democratisation or fundamental pacification will cause them to refrain from exerting pressure on their own nationals abroad. However, the description and assessment of the situation also show that, in addition to counterintelligence measures, prevention – and thus the behaviour of individuals and groups – is particularly important. Switzerland will continue to be a prime target of cyber attacks by states or by state-sponsored perpetrators. Swiss interests may be directly affected, e.g. through attacks on the federal administration, on Swiss companies or on international organisations based in Switzerland. However, IT infrastructures in Switzerland may also be deliberately misused in order to attack targets abroad. Defensive measures Illegal intelligence is conducted mainly on behalf of governments, but criminal law assigns responsibility to individual persons. If circumstances apply which are of relevance under criminal law, then these will be examined 82 SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S using instruments of criminal law. The criminal offences in question require public prosecution, i.e. no criminal complaint by a victim is necessary, as illegal intelligence infringes upon government interests. However, these are defined as political offences, the criminal investigation and prosecution of which require authorisation by the Federal Council. If the perpetrator is a diplomat accredited in Switzerland, the sending country would also have to lift the diplomat's immunity. If there are not sufficient grounds for suspicion to open criminal prosecution proceedings, or if the Federal Council does not grant authorisation for criminal prosecution, other measures are available. For example, the withdrawal of the person engaged in intelligence work can be achieved through informal channels. Further options are expulsion or persona non grata declaration or, in a case where the person is not yet in the country, an entry ban or refusal of the necessary visa or accreditation. These options are supplemented by Federal Council measures – these, too, may consist in expelling a person or prohibiting a person from entering Switzerland. Prevention Despite the range of counterintelligence measures, prevention remains one of the most important tools for countering espionage. Besides the work of the authorities entrusted with prevention, it consists mainly in awareness-raising and training, firstly regarding the handling of sensitive information and secondly

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