defence does not require using the same means as the attack which provided the trigger for
its exercise.
Acts of non-State actors can also constitute armed attacks. Germany has expressed this
view both with regard to the attacks by Al Qaeda76 and the attacks of ISIS.77
In Germany’s view, art. 51 UN Charter requires the attack against which a State can resort to
self-defence to be ‘imminent’. The same applies with regard to self-defence against
malicious cyber operations. Strikes against a prospective attacker who has not yet initiated
an attack do not qualify as lawful self-defence.
V. Conclusions and outlook
As has been exemplified in the present paper with regard to a selection of international
norms, international law as it stands is capable of providing essential guidance on State
behaviour in and with regard to cyberspace. Germany is convinced that uncertainties as to
how international law might be applied in the cyber context can and must be addressed
by having recourse to the established methods of interpretation of international law.78
Germany deems it critically important that interpretative efforts and attempts to clarify the
modalities of the application of international law in cyberspace are based on international
exchange and cooperation. This is why Germany follows closely and is actively involved in
the work of the United Nations’ working groups on cyber and international security.79 In
addition to their work on international law in cyberspace, these groups elaborate voluntary,
non-binding norms for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace which may fulfil an
important function in supplementing the existing ‘hard’ rules of international law. Moreover,
Germany wishes to highlight the importance of States’ reflecting and taking heed of the
multifold and rich academic and civil society debates worldwide on the role and function
of international law in the cyber context.
Challenges lie ahead: Information and communication technologies are evolving fast, and so
is the need to provide adequate legal assessments and to find responses to novel factual
situations. While international law provides a sufficient framework to cope with the fast pace
of technological change and remains applicable also to new developments, its interpretation
and effective application in the cyber context will increasingly be dependent on an in-depth
understanding of technological intricacies and complexities. This may require an intensified
pooling of technical and legal expertise. Also, evidentiary difficulties with regard to States’
and non-State actors’ behaviour in cyberspace will continue to pose practical challenges.
76
77
78
79
See Letter dated 29 November 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/1127.
See Letter dated 10 December 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S /2015/946.
In the case of international treaties, these are codified in arts. 31 et seq. of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, 23 May 1969, UNTS 1155, 331.
I.e. the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in
the Context of International Security (GGE) and the Open-ended Working Group on developments in the field of
information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG).
16
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