be proportionate and respect fundamental human rights, obligations of a humanitarian
character prohibiting reprisals and peremptory norms of international law.65
Due to the multifold and close interlinkage of cyber infrastructures not only across different
States but also across different institutions and segments of society within States, cyber
countermeasures are specifically prone to generating unwanted or even unlawful side
effects. Against this background, States must be particularly thorough and prudent in
examining whether or not the applicable limitation criteria to cyber countermeasures
are met. 66
A State may – a maiore ad minus – engage in cyber reconnaissance measures in order to
explore options for countermeasures and assess the potential risk of side effects if such
measures fulfil the requirements for countermeasures.
(3) Measures taken on the basis of necessity
The wrongfulness of a State’s cyber operation that contravenes its international obligations
may be precluded by exception if that State acted out of necessity.67 This entails that a State
may – under certain narrow circumstances – act against malicious cyber operations by
resorting, for its part, to active counter-operations even in certain situations in which the
prerequisites for countermeasures or self-defence are not met.
The draft articles on State responsibility, which reflect customary law in this regard, inter alia
require that the act must be ‘the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest
against a grave and imminent peril’.68 Whether an ‘interest’ is ‘essential’ depends on the
circumstances.69 Germany holds the view that, in the cyber context, the affectedness of an
‘essential interest’ may inter alia be explained by reference to the type of infrastructure
actually or potentially targeted by a malicious cyber operation and an analysis of that
infrastructure’s relevance for the State as a whole. For example, the protection of certain
critical infrastructures70 may constitute an ‘essential interest’.71 It might likewise be
determined by reference to the type of harm actually or potentially caused as a
consequence of a foreign State’s cyber operation. For example, the protection of its citizens
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), arts. 51, 50 para. 1 (b), (c), and (d); cf. Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4),
rules 23, 22.
Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 23, commentary, para. 6.
Cf. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgement of 25
September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, 7, para. 51; Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 25; Tallinn
Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 26 with commentaries.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 25 para. 1 (a). The Draft articles on State Responsibility further
require that the act in question must ‘not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole’ and state that ‘necessity may [in any
case] not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) the international obligation in
question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or (b) the State has contributed to the situation of
necessity’, see art. 25 para. 1 (b) and 2.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 25, commentary, para. 15.
On the concept of ‘critical infrastructures’ see above, II.a).
Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 26, commentary, para. 2, correctly noting, however, that the ‘designation [of an
infrastructure as critical by a State] as such does not necessarily deprive other infrastructure of its essentiality’ and
that ‘a State’s unilateral description of infrastructure as critical [is not] determinative of the issue.’
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