Extensible Authentication Protocol-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) is considered one of the most secure EAP methods and is widely supported. It uses a Public Key Infrastructure to secure communications between devices and a Remote Access Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server through the use of X.509 certificates. While EAP-TLS provides strong mutual authentication, it requires an organisation to have established a Public Key Infrastructure. This involves deploying their own certificate authority and issuing certificates, or purchasing certificates from a commercial certificate authority, for every device that accesses their wireless networks. While this introduces additional costs and management overheads, the security advantages are significant. Security Control: ISM-1321; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A 802.1X authentication with EAP-TLS, using X.509 certificates, is used for mutual authentication; with all other EAP methods disabled on supplications and authentication servers. Security Control: ISM-1711; Revision: 0; Updated: Sep-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A User identity confidentiality is used if available with EAP-TLS implementations. Evaluation of 802.1X authentication implementation The security of 802.1X authentication is dependent on four main elements and how they interact with each other. These four elements include supplicants, authenticators, wireless access points and authentication servers. To provide assurance that these elements have been implemented correctly, they should have completed an evaluation. Security Control: ISM-1322; Revision: 4; Updated: Sep-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Evaluated supplicants, authenticators, wireless access points and authentication servers are used in wireless networks. Generating and issuing certificates for authentication When issuing certificates to devices in order to access wireless networks, an organisation should be aware that certificates could be stolen by malicious code. Once compromised, certificates could be used on other devices to gain unauthorised access to wireless networks. An organisation should also be aware that in only issuing certificates to devices, any actions taken by users will only be attributable to specific devices. When issuing certificates to users in order to access wireless networks, it can be in the form of certificates that are stored on devices or certificates that are stored on smart cards. While issuing certificates on smart cards provides increased security, it comes at a higher cost. However, users are more likely to notice missing smart cards and alert their security team, who are then able to revoke their credentials, which can minimise the time an adversary has access to wireless networks. In addition, to reduce the likelihood of stolen smart cards from being used to gain unauthorised access to wireless networks, multi-factor authentication can be implemented through the use of personal identification numbers on smart cards. This is particularly important when smart cards grant users any form of administrative access. Security Control: ISM-1324; Revision: 4; Updated: Mar-22; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Certificates are generated using an evaluated certificate authority or hardware security module. Security Control: ISM-1323; Revision: 3; Updated: Sep-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Certificates are required for both devices and users accessing wireless networks. Security Control: ISM-1327; Revision: 2; Updated: Sep-21; Applicability: All; Essential Eight: N/A Certificates are protected by encryption, user authentication, and both logical and physical access controls. Caching 802.1X authentication outcomes When 802.1X authentication is used, a shared secret key known as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is generated upon successful authentication of devices. This PMK is then capable of being cached to assist with fast roaming between wireless access points. When devices roam away from wireless access points they have authenticated to, they will not need to perform a full re-authentication should they roam back while the cached PMK remains valid. To further assist with roaming, wireless access points can be configured to pre-authenticate devices to neighbouring wireless access points that devices might roam to. Although requiring full authentication for devices each time they roam between 121

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