AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY AUSTRALIA WILL: 4.05 Develop a framework to exchange policy and diplomatic contacts, including bilaterally, to facilitate communication in times of crisis or tension arising from significant cyber incidents that have the potential to threaten international peace, security and stability 4.06 Work with regional organisations to conduct risk reduction workshops to enhance our capacity to manage and respond to cyber incidents that threaten international peace, security and stability, including exercising national and regional responses to severe cyber incidents TRANSPARENCY MEASURES Transparency measures provide insight into states’ activities. They reduce the risk of miscommunication as well as the likelihood of overreaction. Australia’s 2016 Cyber Security Strategy, the 2016 Defence White Paper, the forthcoming Foreign Policy White Paper and this Strategy are all examples of transparency measures. Other examples include cyber policy dialogues, sharing Australia’s national cyber governance structures (including cyber incident management arrangements), and outlining Australia’s position on how international law applies to state conduct in cyberspace. Another area where Australia encourages greater candidness is in relation to the military use of offensive cyber capabilities. Just as more and more states are embracing the opportunities of cyberspace to improve service delivery and drive economic growth, it is unsurprising that more and more states are exploring military applications of cyberspace. In and of itself this is not a concern – provided that states 52 acknowledge that military activities in cyberspace are governed by the same sets of rules as military activities in the physical domains. These rules, developed over centuries, restrict and regulate unacceptable conduct. Australia recognises that, just like other military capabilities, some details of cyber capabilities and operations will need to remain classified. By way of analogy, Australia is transparent about the rules that govern the use of conventional capabilities such as missiles on our warships; however, we do not discuss the specifics of the capability, nor would we reveal details of particular operations. We will take the same approach to discussing cyber capabilities. Acknowledgement of these capabilities does not contradict our commitment to a stable and peaceful online environment. Instead it fosters the understanding that states’ activities in cyberspace have limitations and obligations, just as they do in the physical domains (see Conduct and Authorisation of Offensive Cyber Capability in Support of Military Operations, page 55).

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