AUSTRALIA’S INTERNATIONAL CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY
AUSTRALIA WILL:
4.05 Develop a framework to exchange policy and diplomatic contacts, including
bilaterally, to facilitate communication in times of crisis or tension arising
from significant cyber incidents that have the potential to threaten
international peace, security and stability
4.06 Work with regional organisations to conduct risk reduction workshops
to enhance our capacity to manage and respond to cyber incidents that
threaten international peace, security and stability, including exercising
national and regional responses to severe cyber incidents
TRANSPARENCY MEASURES
Transparency measures provide insight
into states’ activities. They reduce the
risk of miscommunication as well as the
likelihood of overreaction.
Australia’s 2016 Cyber Security Strategy,
the 2016 Defence White Paper, the
forthcoming Foreign Policy White Paper
and this Strategy are all examples of
transparency measures. Other examples
include cyber policy dialogues, sharing
Australia’s national cyber governance
structures (including cyber incident
management arrangements), and
outlining Australia’s position on how
international law applies to state conduct
in cyberspace.
Another area where Australia encourages
greater candidness is in relation to
the military use of offensive cyber
capabilities. Just as more and more
states are embracing the opportunities
of cyberspace to improve service
delivery and drive economic growth,
it is unsurprising that more and more
states are exploring military applications
of cyberspace. In and of itself this is
not a concern – provided that states
52
acknowledge that military activities in
cyberspace are governed by the same
sets of rules as military activities in the
physical domains. These rules, developed
over centuries, restrict and regulate
unacceptable conduct.
Australia recognises that, just like
other military capabilities, some details
of cyber capabilities and operations
will need to remain classified. By way
of analogy, Australia is transparent
about the rules that govern the use of
conventional capabilities such as missiles
on our warships; however, we do not
discuss the specifics of the capability,
nor would we reveal details of particular
operations. We will take the same
approach to discussing cyber capabilities.
Acknowledgement of these capabilities
does not contradict our commitment to a
stable and peaceful online environment.
Instead it fosters the understanding
that states’ activities in cyberspace
have limitations and obligations, just
as they do in the physical domains (see
Conduct and Authorisation of Offensive
Cyber Capability in Support of Military
Operations, page 55).
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