6.
Our second goal is to tackle conflict and instability. We will seek to address their
long-term drivers, reduce the incidence and intensity of conflict, and minimise the
opportunities for states and non-state actors to renegotiate power balances and to
undermine international security.
7.
Our third goal is to enhance UK homeland security by tackling transnational
security challenges, addressing a range of increasingly overlapping threats to
our security at home and overseas. These include radicalisation and terrorism,
SOC, and the proliferation of CBRN capabilities and advanced military technology.
3.1 Countering state threats: defence, disruption and deterrence
8.
State threats to the UK, and to our allies, are growing and diversifying as
systemic competition intensifies. States are becoming increasingly assertive in
how they advance their own objectives and in their willingness to undermine ours.
While their actions often fall short of open conflict, they can nevertheless threaten
and interfere with our security, open economy, democracy and social cohesion
– risking escalation into war. State threats are persistent and take many forms,
including espionage, political interference, sabotage, assassination and poisonings,
electoral interference, disinformation, propaganda, cyber operations and intellectual
property theft. These tools of coercion and interference can also be used in ‘hybrid’
combination with more traditional hard power methods.
9.
Great power competition and the opportunism of states such as Russia, Iran and
North Korea are key factors in the deterioration of the security environment and the
weakening of the international order. But the dynamics of systemic competition are
more complex and the UK faces threats from a wider range of states. Non-state
actors also participate in this competition. They often use the same methods, such as
cyber-attacks and disinformation, to target our citizens and exploit our openness for
their own gain. And states increasingly work with non-state actors to achieve their
goals, including as proxies in conflict. This affords them deniability and blurs the line
between state threats and other types of security threats, such as terrorism and SOC.
10. The UK must improve its ability to detect, understand, attribute and act in
response to aggression across the range of state threats, whether in the physical
domain or in cyberspace, and whether military or non-military in nature. We must
work with our allies and like-minded partners to do the same, so that together we are
more resilient and our collective response is greater than the sum of its parts. This will
enable us to manage escalation, by responding in the domain and at a time of our
choosing. It will also strengthen open societies and economies, international security
and the international order.
11. This means that responding to state threats can no longer be viewed as a
narrow ‘national security’ or ‘defence’ agenda. We must bring together the
elements of our work across this Strategic Framework at home and overseas,
and all the instruments available to government, in an integrated response.
70
Integrated Review
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