Outline of National Defense Program Guidelines
Fig. II-3-2-3
Section 2
Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-domain Operations
Capabilities that should be
acquired and strengthened
Outline
Capabilities in space domain
●The SDF will improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning capabilities.
The SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime
to armed contingencies, the SDF will work to strengthen capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.
●The SDF will work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies and with the United States and other relevant countries. The
SDF will also engage in the creation of units specializing in space and develop human resources.
Capabilities in cyber domain
●In order to prevent attack against SDF’s command and communications systems and networks, SDF will continue to strengthen
capabilities for persistent monitoring of them as well as for damage limitation and recovery in case of attack.
●The SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan,
opponent’s use of cyberspace for the attack.
●The SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and contribute to whole-of-government efforts.
Capabilities in electromagnetic
domain
●The SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis
capabilities related to electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. The SDF will improve capabilities to
minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic jamming.
●The SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan.
●In order to smoothly perform these activities, the SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of
electromagnetic spectrum.
Capabilities in maritime and air
domains
●The SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan.
●The SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).
●By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft, the
SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace.
●Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required.
Comprehensive air and missile
defense capability
●In order to counter diverse airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, the SDF will establish a structure with which to
conduct integrated operation of various equipment pieces, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing the
capability to simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. The SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.
Maneuver and deployment
capability
●Requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis. In order to
maneuver and deploy according to situation, the SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities.
●To enable swift and large-scale transport, the SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities
tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. The SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis.
Sustainability and resiliency
●The SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting
important infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, the SDF will improve sustainability
through safe and steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel.
●The SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery from damage, and
substitution of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, the SDF will review existing equipment
maintenance methods, thereby ensuring high operational availability.
As for the cyber domain, the SDF will maintain a Cyber
Defense Unit as a joint unit in order to fundamentally strengthen
cyber defense capability.
In respect to the electromagnetic spectrum domain, the SDF
will strengthen the posture of the Joint Staff Office and of each
SDF service.
The GSDF will maintain surface-to-air guided missile units
and ballistic missile defense units, the MSDF will maintain
Aegis-equipped destroyers, the ASDF will maintain surface-toair guided missile unit, and the SDF will build comprehensive
air and missile defense capability comprising these assets.
The SDF will maintain a maritime transport unit as an
integrated unit that allows SDF units to swiftly maneuver and
be deployed in joint operations.
3
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy
Stand-off defense capability
●The SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to
invade Japan including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes.
●In order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense
capability through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.
Chapter
2 Organization of the GSDF
In order to be able to swiftly respond to various situations,
the GSDF will maintain rapidly deployable basic operational
units furnished with advanced mobility and ISR capabilities.
The GSDF will also maintain mobile operating units
equipped with specialized functions, in order to effectively
perform operations such as: various missions in cyber and
electromagnetic domains.
The GSDF will strengthen its ability to deter and counter
threats to remote islands by taking measures including persistent
steady-state maneuvers and stationing of units. To be able to
counter an invasion, the GSDF will maintain surface-to-ship
guided missile units and hyper-velocity gliding projectile units
for remote island defense.
The GSDF will review their organization and equipment
with a focus on tanks, howitzers and rockets. The GSDF will
also review their organization and equipment related to aerial
Defense of Japan
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