Part 1
Chapter
2
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Defense Policies of Countries
People within and outside Australia expressed their
concerns over the acquisition by Chinese businesses of
Australian facilities, including Port Darwin, a port that has
been used by Australian and the United States fleets among
others. In January 2017, the federal government of Australia
announced the establishment of the Critical Infrastructure
Centre to serve as a dedicated body that will identify
facilities requiring surveillance and carefully manage the
risks for advising related institutions in order to block the
sale of important infrastructure related to national security,
including specific ports and harbor facilities, to companies
from other countries. The Centre manages the risks arising
from foreign involvement by assessing the risks of sabotage,
espionage and coercion in Australia’s critical infrastructure
sectors, including telecommunications, electricity, gas, water
and ports.
With China’s perceived influence on Australia growing
larger, including cases of political figures and parties
receiving huge political contributions and bribes, the
Australian Parliament passed a bill to prevent interference
in domestic affairs by foreign actors. The Australian
government announced that an Australian company would
receive government support and accept an underwater
telecommunication cable network project that was to
be partially conducted by a Chinese telecommunication
company Huawei previously. Moreover, in August 2018,
Huawei revealed that the company and ZTE were banned from
bidding in an Australian 5G (advanced telecommunication
system) network project by the Australian government.
(3)Relations with India
In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia states that
it welcomes India’s increasingly active role in the IndoPacific region, and that it sees India as a key security partner.
Australia notes that it aims to further mature its defense
relationship with India in support of their shared strategic
interests.
The Australia-India relationship was elevated to a strategic
partnership in November 2009, and the two countries have
regularly conducted strategic dialogues, mutual visits by
senior military officers, interactions among military services,
and mutual dispatches of students to military educational
organizations. In November 2014, Prime Minister of India
Narendra Modi visited Australia, marking the first visit
to Australia by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. The
two leaders agreed to extend defense cooperation to cover
research, development, and industry engagement, to hold
regular meetings at the level of Defense Minister and conduct
regular maritime exercises, and to convene talks between
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DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2020
each of their military services. Since then, mutual exchanges
between Australia and India have steadily progressed through
such initiatives as mutual visits of naval ships and joint navy
training exercises.
See
Section 7-1-2 of this Chapter (Military Affairs of India)
(4)Relations with Southeast Asia and Pacific Island
Countries
In the Defence White Paper 2016, Australia regards a secure
nearer region encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and
South Pacific as its strategic interest. In particular, Australia
considers that instability and conflicts in Southeast Asia have
the potential to threaten Australia’s security and economic
relations with countries. Furthermore, Australia depends
on maritime trade with Southeast Asian countries and
maritime trade that transits Southeast Asia. In this regard,
Australia perceives that the security of these sea lanes
must be ensured alongside freedom of navigation. Based
on this understanding, Australia seeks to make military
contributions to support the maritime security of Southeast
Asia and support the governments of Pacific Island and other
countries in building and strengthen their security.
Australia has been deepening its relations with Indonesia
in the security and defense fields following the signing of
the Lombok Treaty—a security cooperation framework
concerning cooperation in a wide range of defense fields—
in November 2006, the elevation of their relationship to a
strategic partnership in March 2010, and the September 2012
conclusion of the Defence Cooperation Arrangement, which
included the enhancement of cooperation in the fields of antiterrorism measures and maritime security. The two countries’
cooperative relations in the security and defense fields have
stalled intermittently. However, since mutual visits by
ministers and higher-level officials resumed in the second
half of 2015, the bilateral relationship has been improving
through many initiatives, including regular Foreign and
Defense Ministerial Meetings (2+2) and the signing of an
agreement on maritime security and terrorism, and of a
Maritime Cooperation Plan of Action in 2018.
With Singapore and Malaysia, Australia carries out
regular joint combined exercises in the South China Sea and
other areas under the Five Power Defence Arrangements
(FPDA; entered into force in 1971) framework, whereby
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom would
consult each other in the event or threat of an armed attack
on Singapore or Malaysia, to decide on their response.
Australia considers that Singapore is its most advanced
defense partner, and that they share Australia’s interest in a
secure maritime trading environment. Defense cooperation is
also deepening, including the signing of a memorandum of
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