S TRATEGIC O BJECTIVE 2.3: I NCREASE THE S PEED AND
S CALE OF I NTELLIGENCE S HARING AND V ICTIM
N OTIFICATION
The timely sharing of threat intelligence between Federal and non-Federal partners enhances
collaborative efforts to disrupt and dismantle adversaries. Open-source cybersecurity intelligence
and private sector intelligence providers have greatly increased collective awareness of cyber threats,
but national intelligence that only the government can collect remains invaluable. For instance, the
NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s national intelligence-driven engagement with industry has
been highly effective at disrupting adversary activity targeting the Defense Industrial Base. Similarly,
CISA enables persistent, multi-directional threat information sharing with the private sector through
the JCDC and, in coordination with the FBI, uses that information to accelerate victim notification
and to reduce the impact of identified intrusions.
The Federal Government will increase the speed and scale of cyber threat intelligence sharing to
proactively warn cyber defenders and notify victims when the government has information that an
organization is being actively targeted or may already be compromised. SRMAs, in coordination
with CISA, law enforcement agencies, and the CTIIC, will identify intelligence needs and priorities
within their sector and develop processes to share warnings, technical indicators, threat context, and
other relevant information with both government and non-government partners. These processes
must provide mechanisms for the private sector to provide timely feedback and their own threat
intelligence to the Federal Government to improve targeting of cyber threats for disruption and
further intelligence collection. The Federal Government will also review declassification policies and
processes to determine the conditions under which extending additional classified access and
expanding clearances is necessary to provide actionable intelligence to owners and operators of
critical infrastructure.
S TRATEGIC O BJECTIVE 2.4: P REVENT A BUSE OF
U.S.-B ASED I NFRASTRUCTURE
Malicious cyber actors exploit U.S.-based cloud infrastructure, domain registrars, hosting and email
providers, and other digital services to carry out criminal activity, malign influence operations, and
espionage against individual victims, businesses, governments, and other organizations in the United
States and abroad. Often, these services are leased through foreign resellers who have multiple
degrees of separation from their U.S.-based providers, hindering the ability of those providers to
address abuse complaints or respond to legal process from U.S. authorities. The Federal
Government will work with cloud and other internet infrastructure providers to quickly identify
malicious use of U.S.-based infrastructure, share reports of malicious use with the government, make
it easier for victims to report abuse of these systems, and make it more difficult for malicious actors
to gain access to these resources in the first place.
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY
16
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