Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Fig. I-3-4-3
Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles
New York
Taepodong-2 variant
ICBM-class “Hwasong-15”
(Range: more than 10,000km*)
*Depends on weight of the warhead, etc.
Washington D. C.
10,000km
Chicago
London
Paris
San Francisco
Los Angeles
5,500km
Moscow
Anchorage
5,000km
4,000km
Hawaii
1,500km
New Delhi
ICBM-class “Hwasong-14”
(Range: more than 5,500km)
1,300km
Beijing
1,000km
Pyongyang Tokyo
Okinawa Guam
IRBM-class “Hwasong-12”
(Range: approx. 5,000km)
Chapter
3
Musudan
(Range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km)
Nodong
(Range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km)
Defense Policies of Countries
Scud-ER
(Range: approx. 1,000km)
Jakarta
Canberra
Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience.
Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.
Note 3: The firing range for ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-17” can reach 15,000 km or more, depending on the warhead’s weight etc. When hypothetically calculating a distance
of 15,000 km from Pyongyang, the trajectory can include the whole African continent and part of the South American continent.
reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests,
it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized
nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.12 There
have also been reports that North Korea possesses 40 to 50
nuclear warheads.13
Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons
test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a
maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size
of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted
that the test was of a hydrogen bomb.14
In addition, it has been suggested that North Korea has
been working on restoring its northern nuclear test site
since March 2022, which it publicly announced it had
blown up in 2018.
In any case, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development,
considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to
enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending
12
13
14
15
83
the range of ballistic missiles that are the delivery vehicles
of WMDs, poses grave and imminent threats to Japan’s
security, and significantly undermines peace and security
of the region and international community. These trends
have been growing in recent years, and it can never be
accepted.
b. Background of the Nuclear Program
North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of
the existing regime.15 Taking into account aspects such as
claims by North Korea that nuclear weapons would never
be traded away at negotiations, as well as the significant
qualitative disparity in conventional forces vis-à-vis the
United States and the ROK, it is believed that North Korea
is promoting nuclear development with the recognition that
it needs its own nuclear deterrence to maintain its regime
against the threat from the United States, which includes
nuclear weapons.
Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for
technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten
nuclear weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize
nuclear weapons seems to have reached a considerable level.”
According to SIPRI Yearbook 2021.
The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK noted that the explosive yield of the sixth nuclear test was approximately 50 kt, significantly larger than the yield of the past tests and that this was
assessed to be a hydrogen bomb test. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is
estimated at 6 to 7 kts, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined.
According to “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” by the U.S. DoD (February 2016), and others.
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
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