Korean Peninsula Section 4 May 2017 is equipped with a MaRV. Images of the 2019 ballistic missile launches published by North Korea show that the missiles were launched from different places and hit the specific target. This suggests that North Korea is aiming to enhance the accuracy of attacks by upgrading its existing ballistic missiles and developing new ballistic missiles. Furthermore, in the short-range ballistic missile launches on November 28, 2019 and March 2, 2020, the interval between launching the two missiles on both occasions was estimated at less than 1 minute, suggesting that North Korea is trying to improve the continuous fire capability required for saturation attacks and the like. Thirdly, North Korea appears to be seeking to improve its ability to conduct surprise attacks by enhancing secrecy and instantaneity to make it difficult to detect signs of a launch. Using a TEL or submarine, a ballistic missile that can be launched from any point, makes it difficult to detect signs of it in advance. North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles from TELs and SLBMs. Furthermore, since September 2021, it has also fired rail-launched ballistic missiles. In addition, particularly since 2019, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles that appear to have used solid fuel. It is therefore believed that North Korea is proceeding with the development of solid-fueled ballistic missiles. Generally, solid fuel-propelled ballistic missiles are not only relatively easier to store and handle, but are also preloaded with solid fuel. Therefore, in comparison to liquid fuel-propelled missiles, they can be launched instantly, and the signs of their launch are more difficult to detect. Furthermore, they can be reloaded more quickly. In this respect, they are considered to be superior militarily. Such characteristics are expected to contribute to improving the ability to conduct surprise attacks. Fourthly, North Korea is advancing the development of ballistic missiles that fly at low altitudes with irregular trajectories in an attempt to breach other states’ missile defense networks. SRBM A and SRBM B are believed to be capable of flying at lower altitudes than conventional ballistic missiles with irregular trajectories. In addition, rail-launched ballistic missiles and new types of SLBMs launched after 2021 all have external similarities with SRBM A and fly with irregular trajectories. Furthermore, since September of the same year, North Korea has also repeatedly launched what it calls “hypersonic missiles.” In this way, North Korea is believed DEFENSE WHITE PAPER Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries on the day of the launch of a “Hwasong-15” ICBM-class ballistic missile which could have a range of over 10,000 km depending on the weight of its warhead, claiming that it had re-verified warhead reliability in a reentry environment, is displaying an intention to seek to secure and enhance technology aimed at the operationalization of long-range ballistic missiles. In addition, based on the flight trajectory at the time, the ICBM-class ballistic missile launched by North Korea on March 24, 2022 can be assumed to have a range in excess of 15,000 km depending on the weight of the warhead deployed, etc., in which case the entire U.S. would fall within its range. Should North Korea make further progress in the development of ballistic missiles, including the acquiring of reentry technologies related to long range ballistic missiles, it may come to have a one-sided understanding that it has secured a strategic deterrence against the United States. If North Korea has such a false sense of confidence and recognition regarding its deterrence, it could lead to an increase and escalation of military provocations by North Korea in the region and could create situations that are deeply worrying also for Japan. North Korea is presumed to have acquired the atmospheric re-entry technologies required for the operationalization of Nodong and Scud-ER ballistic missiles, within whose range Japan lies, suggesting that it already has the ability to attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to these ballistic missiles. Secondly, North Korea may be aiming to enhance the accuracy, continuous fire capability, and operational capabilities necessary for saturation attacks and the like. As for the Scud and Nodong, since 2014, they have been launched from unprecedented locations, cutting across the Korean Peninsula, in the early morning and late hours of the night using TELs, often in multiple numbers. This indicates the ability to launch Scud and Nodong missiles from any place and at any time. In addition, the four ballistic missiles, apparently Scud ERs, launched on March 6, 2017, were launched simultaneously. Furthermore, in recent years, North Korea has conducted target practice combining SRBMs with various types of artillery. Through such launches, North Korea may be working to improve not only its research and development of ballistic missiles but also its actual operational capabilities. Some have noted that a ballistic missile which appears to have been modified from the Scud missile launched in 92

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