Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan Area Defense (THAAD)32 was temporarily deployed by the U.S. Forces Korea in September 2017. In addition, in a U.S.-ROK summit meeting also held in September, the enhanced deployment of U.S. strategic assets in and around the ROK on a rotational basis was agreed. Recently, at the 53rd SCM in December 2021, the United States and ROK expanded their Alliance from the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia to the Indo-Pacific region, approved new Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG) after not doing so for 11 years, and updated their operation plans based on the SPG. In regard to this, the United States and the ROK stated that this reflected “changes to the strategic environment,” including the North Korean threat. It has been pointed out that the background includes factors such as the increasing sophistication of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities. On the other hand, in regard to joint U.S.-ROK military exercises, the United States and the ROK have suspended large-scale maneuver exercises and reduced the scale of command exercises since 2018 in response to progress in dialogue with North Korea.33 They have also reduced the scale of and postponed exercises since 2020 due to factors such as the impact of COVID-19. Moreover, at the new year press conference in January 2021, then President Moon Jae-in mentioned in relation to U.S.-ROK joint military training that North Korea would react sensitively to every exercise, and that it would be possible to have a discussion with North Korea through the Inter-Korean Joint Military Committee. However, even after 2021, regular U.S.-ROK joint command exercises and other exercises have been conducted on a reduced scale. At the same time, the two countries have worked to deal with such issues as the transition of operational control (OPCON) to the ROK34 and the realignment of U.S. Forces Korea. For the transition of OPCON to the ROK, the roadmap for the transfer “Strategic Alliance 2015” was established in October 2010. Aiming to complete the transition by December 1, 2015, the two countries have reviewed the approach of transitioning from the existing combined defense arrangement of the U.S. and ROK Forces, to a new joint defense arrangement led by the ROK Forces and Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries 32 33 34 101 supported by the U.S. Forces. Nevertheless, based on the increasing seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, the two sides decided at the 46th SCM to re-postpone the transition of OPCON, and to adopt a conditions-based approach, i.e., implementing the transition when conditions such as the ROK Forces’ enhanced capabilities are met. At the 50th SCM in October 2018, it was decided that following the transition of OPCON, a ROK military officer will serve as commander of the Future Combined Forces Command, replacing the current arrangement of a U.S. military officer serving as the commander of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces. In August 2019, the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) verification regarding the ROK Forces’ operational capabilities was conducted during combined command post exercises. At the 51st SCM in November 2019, the two parties concurred that the exercise had played an important role in verifying IOC and decided to pursue an assessment of Full Operational Capability for the Future Combined Forces Command in 2020. However, due to the impact of COVID-19 and other factors, the preliminary exercise was only conducted in the same year and in 2021. At the 53rd SCM in December 2021, it was decided that the FOC assessment would be conducted in 2022. The ROK Forces plan to enhance and expand early the military capabilities leading the U.S.-ROK Alliance and defense capabilities needed to address North Korean nuclear and missile threat, which are required for the transition of OPCON, and accelerate the transition of OPCON through periodic evaluations of readiness. With regard to the realignment of the U.S. Forces Korea, an agreement was reached in 2003 on the relocation of the U.S. Forces’ Yongsan Garrison located in the center of Seoul to the Pyeontaek area, south of Seoul, and on the relocation of the U.S. Forces stationed north of the Han River to the south of the river. Subsequently, however, the agreement has been partially revised, due to various factors, including: in relation to the postponement of the transition of OPCON, it has been necessary for some U.S. Forces personnel to remain at Yongsan Garrison; and it was decided that the counter-fires forces of U.S. Forces Korea A ballistic missile defense system designed to intercept short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase from the ground. It captures and intercepts targets at high altitudes outside of the atmosphere or in the upper atmosphere. See Part III, Chapter 1, Section 2 regarding the ballistic missile defense system In regard to “Freedom Guardian” and “Key Resolve,” “new combined command post training” to replace these exercises have been conducted once in both the first and second half of the year starting in 2019. The United States and the ROK have had the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command since 1978 in order to operate the U.S.-ROK combined defense system to deter wars on the Korean Peninsula and to perform effective combined operations in the case of a contingency. Under the U.S.-ROK combined defense system, OPCON over the ROK Forces is to be exercised by the Chairman of the Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff in peacetime and by the Commander of the U.S. Forces Korea, who concurrently serves as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, in a contingency. DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022

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