Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan “historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line” claimed by China, and determined the illegality of China’s activities such as land reclamation. However, China has clearly stated its intention not to comply with the award and has continued the militarization of the features by developing military facilities such as batteries and various infrastructures that can be used for military purposes, such as runways, harbors, hangars and radar facilities, and by deploying military aircraft and conducting air trainings such as taking off and landing. These activities may result in a significant improvement of Chinese operational conducting capability within the South China Sea. It has been pointed out that if China were to consider bastion operations (fortification) to enhance the survivability of new type of long-range SLBMs capable of targeting the U.S. mainland, the South China Sea would be the suitable choice.2 Moreover, in July and August 2016 after the arbitration award between the Philippines and China was rendered, an H-6K bomber of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conducted combat air patrols in the airspace around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of National Defense announcing that it would conduct these patrols regularly from now on. Furthermore, it is to be believed that China conducted military exercises and launch experiments for ballistic missiles. These show the PLA has been intensifying its operations in the South China Sea. In a dangerous act that could cause unintended consequences, PLA Navy and other ships approached and obstructed a U.S. Navy ship sailing in the South China Sea in September 2018. Furthermore, China is using methods other than its military. For example, in some cases the China Coast Guard patrol vessels obstructed foreign fisher boats approaching the features by firing warning shots or water cannons at them, and it is pointed out that maritime militia is active.3 Furthermore, China unilaterally announced the establishment of administrative districts called “Xisha District” and “Nansha District” under Sansha City of Hainan Province in April 2020. In response to these actions by China, critical voices are being raised by others besides claimants. For example, in July 2020 the United States issued a Chapter 4 Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum, and Challenges Facing the International Community 2 3 4 179 statement from the U.S. Secretary of State saying that China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea are unlawful. The State Department also released a report, in January 2022, about the way that China’s unlawful claims of territorial rights and jurisdiction gravely undermine the rule of law in the oceans. (3) Unintended Contingency Avoidance Initiatives Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in recent years progress has been made in efforts to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies. First, at the Japan-China summit meeting held on May 9, 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China” with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and PLA. The mechanism went into operation in June of the same year. As for multi-national initiatives, in April 2014, navies of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United States, and China, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).4 CUES sets forth a code of conduct such as procedures and communication method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by vessels or aircraft of the navies of these countries. In November 2014, the United States and China agreed on measures pertaining to mutual notification of military activities, together with rules of behavior to avert collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the two countries announced an agreement concerning an additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official discussions have been held for the establishment of the Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC). It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and skies will supplement the existing international order and that the countries concerned, including China, refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2021). For example, the Philippines’ Department of National Defense expressed deep concern over the presence of 220 Chinese maritime militia vessels around Whitsun Reef, and demanded immediate withdrawal in March 2021. This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties. DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022

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