2 3 including military cooperation, with the exception of ambassador-level NRC meetings as a result of Russia’s illegal “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in southern Ukraine in 2014. (3) The “Annexation” of Crimea and Conflict in Eastern Ukraine Following a political upheaval in Ukraine in February 2014, armed forces purported to be Russian troops occupied the Council of Ministers building and the Parliamentary building in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in southern Ukraine and also took control of airports and highways leading to the mainland of Ukraine, and major Ukrainian military installations. After taking de facto control of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Russia illegally “annexed” Crimea in March of the same year following the results of a “referendum” held in the republic. Meanwhile, in April 2014, separatists and other forces increased their protests and attacks against an interim Ukrainian government in eastern Ukraine and occupied many buildings, including the Council of Ministers buildings. In response to this situation, the interim Ukrainian government condemned Russia over its alleged involvement and mobilized military forces in an attempt to expel the occupying forces, but failed to settle the situation. In May 2014, a “referendum” was held for or against expanding autonomy under the control of the separatist forces in parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. Because the negotiations between Ukrainian government and the separatist forces failed to reach a breakthrough, the Ukrainian forces continued fighting with the separatists receiving a range of support, including purported Russian direct intervention. In September 2014 and February 2015, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, and Ukraine signed “the Minsk agreements”3 for making peace. But sporadic fighting continued in the ensuing years with no progress in the implementation of many of the matters stipulated by the agreements, causing an estimated more than 10,000 casualties. Chapter 2 Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine of the so-called eastward expansion of NATO. In 2002 Ukraine also expressed its will to join NATO in the future both domestically and internationally and embarked on Defense Ministry and military reforms with NATO’s cooperation. But because a consensus had not necessarily been reached within Ukraine on joining NATO by that time and different attitudes towards joining the alliance were expressed every time there was a change of government, Ukraine’s participation in the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) was postponed, although the country’s joining the alliance in the future was agreed on at the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008. Meanwhile, Russia and NATO had a certain level of cooperative relationship at that time, as shown by Russia’s participation in the PfP and the cooperation between NATO and Russia in the Bosnian conflict. In addition, Russia was treated differently from Central and Eastern European countries and other former Soviet states in terms of the relationship with NATO, and in 1997 the NATORussia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established as a framework of sharing what was determined within NATO with Russia. In 2002, the PJC was reorganized into the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which allowed Russia to participate in a certain level of decision-making in common areas of interest as an equal NATO partner. With Russia having this level of cooperation with NATO, Russia did not necessarily continue to strongly oppose NATO member states eastward expansion. In its 2000 military doctrine, Russia regarded as threats the expansion of a military bloc and an alliance that could damage its military security and explicitly evaluated NATO as a threat in its 2010 military doctrine and beyond. But Russia eventually acquiesced the Baltic states joining NATO in 2004 when the Russian president was Putin, who is now leading the Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is also necessary to note that Russia and NATO basically had a relationship of cooperation, including their Air Forces conducting joint exercises,2 except for a certain time after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War until NATO and European countries halted in principle their working-level cooperation with Russia,  The NATO-Russia air force joint exercise “Vigilant Skies” was conducted from 2011 to 2013 as part of cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self- government in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal security guarantees for the participants of the consultations. DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 8

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