British Army in July 2021, and the Rapid Trident 2021
joint exercise with the U.S. Army in September 2021,
involving many participating countries, mainly NATO
member states.
(3) The Rekindling of Military Tension after the Fall of 2021
3
surface missiles equipped with conventional warheads
such as Kalibr and Iskander as well as with strategic
nuclear forces. Through these series of exercises, Russia
further increased military tension in the region and used
the exercises as an opportunity to mass troops around
Ukraine.
On February 21, 2022, President Putin held a Security
Council meeting and confirmed that the senior members
of his administration approved of the recognition of the
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s
Republic” by the pro-Russian separatist forces in eastern
Ukraine. Following this confirmation, he recognized their
“independence” and signed the “Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance” with the heads
of these two “Republics.” In addition, the president
ordered the Russian Ministry of Defense to conduct
peacekeeping operations by the AFRF in the territory of
these “Republics,” claiming that he had received a request
from the “Republics” for support based on the “Treaty on
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” and
requested the Federation Council (the upper house of
the Federal Assembly of Russia) to approve the dispatch
of Russian troops to the outside of Russia. This made it
clear that Russia had the will to take military operations
at least in eastern Ukraine. At that time it was thought that
120 BTGs—a force approximately 170,000 to 190,000
strong—were concentrated in Belarus and Russia and on
the Crimean Peninsula and that Russia could launch a
full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
In response to Russia’s increasing its forces around
the Ukrainian border and on the Crimean Peninsula and
in order to prepare against a possible Russian invasion,
Ukraine started in January of the same year to organize
the Territorial Defense Forces (25 brigades across the
country) that is mainly structured with reservists and
complements a standing army. Ukraine also launched
the Zametil 2022 command and staff exercise across the
country on February 9, 2022, as a counter move to the
Russia–Belarus Allied Resolve joint exercise.
Chapter
2
Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine
It is pointed out that after late October 2021, more than
one month after the end of the Zapad 2021 strategic
exercise, U.S. and U.K. intelligence authorities released
their evaluation that Russian troops might invade Ukraine
in early 2022 because the equipment of Central Military
District units, which was left as they were around the
border with Ukraine under the pretext of participating in the
exercise in the spring of 2021, did not return to the base
and actively disclosed their intelligence and analyses of
Russia’s possible aggression against Ukraine. In addition,
focusing on Russia continuously increasing its forces
especially around the Ukrainian border, the United States
and other related countries urged Russia to ease tensions
through diplomatic efforts and also expressed their will to
support Ukraine by means other than dispatching troops to
the country, including arms supply.
While Russia consistently denied the indications of
the United States and other related countries that it might
invade Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry released
its own draft of a treaty and agreement with the United
States and NATO on the non-expansion of NATO in
December 2021, practically demanding that the United
States and other NATO member states recognize the
former Soviet states as Russia’s “sphere of influence”
by claiming that Russia would not allow more of those
countries, including Ukraine, to join NATO. While
Russia continued in and after January 2022 to negotiate
with the United States and NATO in relation to this
move, it conducted a succession of exercises, including
an exercise with all Russian Navy fleets participating in
it, the Allied Resolve 2022 exercise with Eastern Military
District units as the main force that were deployed
from the Far East to Belarus by railway transport, and
a strategic deterrence forces exercise with surface-to-
How Russia Started an Aggression against Ukraine and an Outlook on It
1 The Failure of Russia’s Blitzkrieg and
Ukraine’s Defense in an Early Battle
On February 24, 2022, Russia started a full-scale
aggression against Ukraine under the plea of a “Special
Military Operation” to disarm Ukraine in order to
protect the residents of “Donetsk People’s Republic”
and “Luhansk People’s Republic.”
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
10
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