Outline of NDPG Section 3
and multilayered security cooperation, taking into
account the characteristics and situation specific to
each region and country. As part of such efforts, Japan
will actively leverage its defense capability to work
on defense cooperation and exchanges which include
bilateral/multilateral training and exercises, defense
equipment and technology cooperation, capacity
building assistance, and service-to-service exchanges.
2
Furthermore, Japan will also contribute to address
global security challenges. Moreover, in implementing
these initiatives, Japan will position the Japan-U.S.
Alliance as its cornerstone and will work closely with
the countries that share universal values and security
interests, through full coordination with its diplomatic
policy.
Priorities in Strengthening Defense Capability
Fig. II-2-3-3
2
budget and human resource allocation, and undertake
necessary fundamental reforms.
See
Fig. II-2-3-3 (Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities
Necessary for Cross-domain Operations)
Japan’s Security and Defense Policy
For priority capability areas in strengthening defense
capability, the NDPG sets forth that Japan will develop
those areas as early as possible, allocating resources
flexibly and intensively without adhering to existing
Chapter
Priorities in Strengthening Capabilities Necessary for Cross-domain Operations
Capabilities that should be
acquired and strengthened
Outline
● The SDF will improve various capabilities that leverage space domain including information-gathering, communication and positioning
Capabilities in space
domain
capabilities. The SDF will also build a structure to conduct persistent space situation monitoring. To ensure superiority in use of space at
all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies, the SDF will work to strengthen capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control,
communications and information.
● The SDF will work to enhance cooperation with relevant agencies and with the United States and other relevant countries. The SDF will also
engage in the creation of units specializing in space and develop human resources.
● In order to prevent attack against SDF’s command and communications systems and networks, SDF will continue to strengthen capabilities for
Capabilities in cyber
domain
persistent monitoring of them as well as for damage limitation and recovery in case of attack.
● The SDF will fundamentally strengthen its cyber defense capability, including capability to disrupt, during attack against Japan, opponent’s use
of cyberspace for the attack.
● The SDF will significantly expand its human resources with specialized expertise and skills, and contribute to whole-of-government efforts.
● The SDF will work to enhance information and communications capabilities as well as information collection and analysis capabilities related to
Capabilities in
electromagnetic
domain
electromagnetics, and develop an information sharing posture. The SDF will improve capabilities to minimize the effect of opponent’s electronic
jamming.
● The SDF will strengthen capabilities to neutralize radar and communications of opponent who intends to invade Japan.
● In order to smoothly perform these activities, the SDF will enhance its ability to appropriately manage and coordinate the use of electromagnetic
spectrum.
● The SDF will reinforce its posture for conducting persistent ISR at sea and in the air around Japan.
● The SDF will also strengthen surface and underwater operational capabilities including Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).
Capabilities in maritime
● By taking measures such as developing a fighter force structure that features Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) fighter aircraft, the
and air domains
SDF will improve air operation capability particularly on the Pacific side of Japan, where number of air bases is limited despite its vast airspace.
● Japan will take necessary measures to enable STOVL fighter aircraft to operate from existing SDF ships as required.
Stand-off defense
capability
● The SDF will acquire stand-off firepower and other requisite capabilities to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to invade Japan
including remote islands from the outside of their threat envelopes.
● In order to appropriately leverage advances in military technologies, Japan will swiftly and flexibly strengthen stand-off defense capability
through measures such as comprehensive research and development of related technologies.
Comprehensive air
and missile defense
capability
Maneuver and
deployment capability
● In order to counter diverse airborne threats of ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, the SDF will establish a structure with which to conduct
integrated operation of various equipment pieces, thereby providing persistent nation-wide protection and also enhancing the capability to
simultaneously deal with multiple, complex airborne threats. The SDF will also study ways to counter future airborne threats.
● Requisite SDF units need to conduct sustained, persistent activities in appropriate areas on a steady-state basis. In order to maneuver and
deploy according to the situation, the SDF will strengthen amphibious operation and other capabilities.
● To enable swift and large-scale transport, the SDF will strengthen joint transport capability including inter- and intra-theater transport capabilities
tailored to the characteristics of remote island areas. The SDF will also work to collaborate with commercial transport on a steady-state basis.
● The SDF will take necessary measures for securing ammunition and fuel, ensuring maritime shipping lanes, and protecting important
Sustainability and
resiliency
infrastructure. In particular, while cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, the SDF will improve sustainability through safe and
steady acquisition and stockpiling of ammunition and fuel.
● The SDF will also improve resiliency in a multi-layered way through efforts including dispersion, recovery from damage, and substitution
of infrastructure and other foundations for SDF operations. Further, the SDF will review existing equipment maintenance methods, thereby
ensuring high operational availability.
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