Part I
Chapter
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Russian armored vehicles drive in Ukraine
[SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo]
2
Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine
As factors that led Russia to invade Ukraine, political
ones, including Russia’s recognition of NATO’s
eastward expansion as a threat, are pointed out. In
particular, if Ukraine and Georgia joined NATO on
their own will after other Central and Eastern European
countries and the Baltic states, Russia would lose more
of its buffer zones with NATO on the western border.
Also, if Ukraine sought to practically increase its
military capabilities and interoperability with NATO
by developing its cooperation with the alliance with the
will to join, even if there was no prospect for them to
join, it would imperil Ukraine as a Russian “sphere of
influence,” which Russia considered unacceptable.
On the other hand, it is pointed out that some more
military factors directly led Russia to decide to invade
Ukraine. Namely, it is conceivable that Russia might
have had an optimistic assessment about Ukraine’s will
and military capability to resist invaders based on its
successful experience of “annexing” Crimea in 2014
and on that Russia had grown increasingly confident
about the Russian military capability improvements
through structural reforms and modernization under the
Putin administration.5
In the initial phase of its aggression against Ukraine,
the Russian military launched missile attacks to destroy
Ukrainian air defense systems and air power. But Russian
troops started ground invasions on multiple fronts, from
northern Ukraine and the northeastern border to the
capital Kyiv, from the eastern border to Kharkiv, and
from the Crimean Peninsula to Kherson, Zaporizhzhia,
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and the coast of the Sea of Azov without carrying out
thorough missile attacks and securing air superiority.
Regarding the reasons why Russian troops did not carry
out thorough missile attacks, some point out that the
Russian military might have had optimistic assessments
that they would be able to discourage Ukraine from
resisting and incapacitate the Ukrainian military with
missile attacks and simultaneous ground invasions on
multiple fronts and that the Russian military might have
been lacking adequate targeting capability for missile
attacks such as reconnaissance satellites in addition to
the problem on its insufficient supply capability caused
by the limitation of missile production capability.
Furthermore, poor coordination between the Russian
Land Force and the Aerospace Force due to the lack
of inter-service joint operation capabilities, and the
separate commanding structure by different military
districts for each operational front due to the absence of
a unified commanding authority, lead to the lack of air
support for ground units as well as too stretched posture
and piecemeal attacks of ground forces. It could be seen
that these are the major factors that allowed Armed
Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and State Border Guards to
repel each Russian units separately. Ukraine’s Deputy
Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced as of about
one and a half days after Russia started its aggression
against Ukraine that the Russian side had lost 2,800
personnel, up to 80 tanks, and 516 armored combat
vehicles. It is pointed out that these huge Russian losses
were caused by the Ukrainian military making effective
use of equipment including antitank missiles provided
by the United States and other NATO member states.
The Russian military not only started its ground
invasion on the same day as missiles attacks but also
occupied Hostomel Airport in northwestern Kyiv by
airborne units on the day of the start of invasion and
attempted to invade Kyiv by light armored units on the
day after the start of invasion. These moves imply that
Russia planned to remove the Zelenskyy administration
by initially seizing the capital Kyiv. From the earliest
stage of the Russian aggression, President Zelenskyy
clearly and consistently showed his intention to stay
in Kyiv, resulting in a failed attempt by Russia to
As an example of explanations for the reasons why Russian political and military leaders, including President Putin, decided to invade Ukraine, on March 8, 2022, William Burns, Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said during a House Intelligence Committee hearing: Putin judged the situation as suitable for the use of force against Ukraine on the basis of the following
assumptions: (1) Ukraine is so weak that it can easily be intimidated; (2) Public attention will be distracted from the Ukraine situation in Europe, especially France and Germany, due to a presidential
election and a change of government; (3) The Russian economy will be able to weather the sanctions; and (4) Russia’s modernized military can win in a quick and decisive manner at minimum
costs.
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
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