China Section 2 3 4 5 advanced technology and becoming an “innovation superpower.”3 In light of this, it is suggested that China is planning to offset its military power gap with the U.S. military, and may recognize that the “intelligentization” of its forces is a necessary condition for this. It is thought that China will aim to build a military that “can fight and win a war” against the U.S. military in the “intelligentized warfare” in the future.4 Based on that recognition, it is expected that China will further accelerate the military modernization against the backdrop of national power development and General Secretary Xi’s enhancement of his power base in the CCP and expansion of his power as Chairman of the Central Military Commission5. 3 Transparency Concerning Defense Policies and Military Affairs Chapter 3 China has neither set out a clear and specific future vision of its military strengthening, nor ensured adequate transparency of its decision-making process in relation to military and security affairs. China has released a defense white paper almost every two years since 1998. Most recently, it released a defense white paper in July 2019 for the first time in approximately four years. The latest one was titled “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” In those publications as well, China has not fully disclosed information such as specific weapons in possession, procurement goals and results, organization and locations of major units, records of main military operations and exercises, and a detailed breakdown of its national defense budget. Incidents in which Chinese authorities provide factually inaccurate explanations or refuse to admit facts regarding Chinese military activities have been confirmed, inciting concerns over China’s military decision-making and actions. For example, the submerged transit of a Chinese Navy submarine through Japan’s contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands was confirmed in January 2018, but China did not acknowledge this. Similarly, in the cases of submarines presumed to belong to China that were confirmed in the contiguous zone around Amami Oshima Island in June 2020 and September 2021, China did not Defense Policies of Countries waters to protect its expanding overseas interests. Furthermore, China seems to emphasize not only physical means but also non-physical means in military affairs and warfare. It regards the concept of “Three Warfares” - “Media Warfare,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Legal Warfare” - as part of the political work of the military. In addition, China has set forth a policy of coordinating military struggle closely with political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors. As for the future goals of the development of national defense and military forces, General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th CCP National Congress in October 2017 and the defense white paper released in 2019 noted that China would try to (1) basically achieve mechanization and make great progress in informatization to dramatically improve strategic capabilities by 2020, (2) basically complete the modernization of national defense and military forces by 2035, and (3) generally transform Chinese forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st century. These goals reportedly indicate that the third stage of the “Three Stage Development Strategy” for the basic modernization of national defense and military forces by the middle of the 21st century would be achieved 15 years ahead of schedule. The goals thus might have been based on fasterthan-expected progress in the military modernization for China itself. In addition, during the 5th Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the CCP in October 2020, China expressed its determination to achieve a struggle goal for the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the PLA in 2027. The same was reemphasized at the 6th Plenary Session in 2021. This goal could have been newly set as an interim goal up to the second stage with the deadline for achievement in 2035, following the near achievement of the goal of the first stage described above. However, China has recognized a wide gap between the real military modernization level and the level required for national security, and between Chinese and world-class military forces. Although China has not defined what it means by “world-class forces,” it has been pointed out that China may seek to develop a military that is equal to - or in some cases superior to - the U.S. military. Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that China aims to build “world-class forces” capable of “intelligentized warfare” by acquiring According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2021). There is a view that “intelligentization” of the military provides an excellent opportunity for a latecomer’s military to leap ahead in development and thereby rapidly surpass other advanced-level militaries. The Central Military Commission is a leading and commanding organ to China’s armed forces. Formally, there are the CCP CMC and the People’s Republic of China CMC. However, each consists of the same members, indicating both commissions as an organ for the party to control the armed forces. DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 32

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