Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan 2 Military Trends of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Region 1 General Situation During the former Trump administration, the United States indicated that the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition from revisionist powers including China was a central challenge to its prosperity and security. With this as a backdrop, the United States recognizes that China is pursuing regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific in the near future through the modernization of its military and other efforts.3 The Biden administration is continuing to take the deterrence stance against China. In February 2021, President Biden, in his address on diplomatic policies, called China “the most serious competitor” of the United States, and then in his remarks to the Department of Defense in the same month mentioned that the United States would need to respond to the issues brought by China for defending its interest in the Indo-Pacific and around the world. Furthermore, in March 2021, the United States released its Interim Guidance in which it describes China as “the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” At the congressional hearing held in the same month, the Commander of the U.S. IndoPacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Phil Davidson described the military balance in the Indo-Pacific as not desirable to the United States and its allies, and pointed out the growing risk of China seeking to change the status quo in the region. He testified that China was accelerating its ambitions for taking the U.S.’s leading role in a rules-based global order, and that China’s ambitions for Taiwan would become clear within the next six years. In response to such a U.S. perception, China expressed that it expects the United States to abandon the outdated zero-sum thinking and take more rational and practical policies towards China. In November of the same year, at the Aspen Security Forum on national security held by the United States, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley pointed out that the coming 10 to 20 years will be a significant challenge for national security because China’s aspiration is to challenge the United States globally and to revise the Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries 3 4 5 65 According to “United States National Defense Strategy” (January 2018). DOD NEWS NOV.3.2021 According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on December 11, 2019. DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022 international order to their advantage.4 In September of the same year, a U.S.-China summit telephone talk was held, in which the two leaders discussed the responsibilities of the United States and China to ensure that the competition between the two countries does not veer into conflict. During the telephone talk, President Biden underscored the enduring interest of the United States in the peace, stability, and prosperity of the IndoPacific region and the world. President Xi Jinping called for cooperation in various areas of international issues, such as climate change and economic recovery, while also criticizing the United States’ tough stance toward China. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2022, which was enacted in December of the same year, placed importance on strategic competition with China and Russia. It added new initiatives to strengthen the posture and capabilities of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including the formulation of a United States National Strategy with respect to China and the implementation of an annual report on Taiwan. In the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2” Meeting in January 2022, the United States expressed its determination to optimize its posture and capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. The DoD Annual Report to Congress 2021 pointed out that China aims to displace U.S. alliances and security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region and revise the international order to be more advantageous to China’s authoritarian system and national interests. In relation to the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which came to an end in August 2019, the United States demands the inclusion of China into arms control negotiations, as China has beefed up land-based conventional ballistic missile capabilities outside the framework of the INF Treaty. In addition, the United States expressed the same view in the process of the extension negotiation of the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), of which the extension was decided in February 2021, clearly showing its intention to put a certain degree of brake on China’s missile capability development. However, China has been consistently refusing5 to slow down, claiming that the United States should lead the

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