Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
2
Military Trends of the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific Region
1 General Situation
During the former Trump administration, the United
States indicated that the re-emergence of long-term
strategic competition from revisionist powers including
China was a central challenge to its prosperity and
security. With this as a backdrop, the United States
recognizes that China is pursuing regional hegemony
in the Indo-Pacific in the near future through the
modernization of its military and other efforts.3 The
Biden administration is continuing to take the deterrence
stance against China. In February 2021, President Biden,
in his address on diplomatic policies, called China “the
most serious competitor” of the United States, and then
in his remarks to the Department of Defense in the same
month mentioned that the United States would need to
respond to the issues brought by China for defending its
interest in the Indo-Pacific and around the world.
Furthermore, in March 2021, the United States
released its Interim Guidance in which it describes China
as “the only competitor potentially capable of combining
its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological
power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open
international system.” At the congressional hearing held
in the same month, the Commander of the U.S. IndoPacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Phil Davidson
described the military balance in the Indo-Pacific as not
desirable to the United States and its allies, and pointed
out the growing risk of China seeking to change the
status quo in the region. He testified that China was
accelerating its ambitions for taking the U.S.’s leading
role in a rules-based global order, and that China’s
ambitions for Taiwan would become clear within the next
six years. In response to such a U.S. perception, China
expressed that it expects the United States to abandon
the outdated zero-sum thinking and take more rational
and practical policies towards China. In November of
the same year, at the Aspen Security Forum on national
security held by the United States, U.S. Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley pointed out that the
coming 10 to 20 years will be a significant challenge
for national security because China’s aspiration is to
challenge the United States globally and to revise the
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
3
4
5
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According to “United States National Defense Strategy” (January 2018).
DOD NEWS NOV.3.2021
According to the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China on December 11, 2019.
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
international order to their advantage.4 In September
of the same year, a U.S.-China summit telephone
talk was held, in which the two leaders discussed the
responsibilities of the United States and China to ensure
that the competition between the two countries does not
veer into conflict. During the telephone talk, President
Biden underscored the enduring interest of the United
States in the peace, stability, and prosperity of the IndoPacific region and the world. President Xi Jinping called
for cooperation in various areas of international issues,
such as climate change and economic recovery, while
also criticizing the United States’ tough stance toward
China. In addition, the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2022, which was enacted in December of the
same year, placed importance on strategic competition
with China and Russia. It added new initiatives to
strengthen the posture and capabilities of U.S. forces
in the Indo-Pacific region, including the formulation
of a United States National Strategy with respect to
China and the implementation of an annual report on
Taiwan. In the Joint Statement of the Japan-U.S. “2+2”
Meeting in January 2022, the United States expressed
its determination to optimize its posture and capabilities
in the Indo-Pacific.
The DoD Annual Report to Congress 2021 pointed
out that China aims to displace U.S. alliances and
security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region and
revise the international order to be more advantageous
to China’s authoritarian system and national interests.
In relation to the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which came to an end in
August 2019, the United States demands the inclusion
of China into arms control negotiations, as China has
beefed up land-based conventional ballistic missile
capabilities outside the framework of the INF Treaty.
In addition, the United States expressed the same view
in the process of the extension negotiation of the New
START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), of
which the extension was decided in February 2021,
clearly showing its intention to put a certain degree
of brake on China’s missile capability development.
However, China has been consistently refusing5 to slow
down, claiming that the United States should lead the
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