Relations between the United States and China, etc. Section 3 3 Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic Progressive Party, who took office in 2016, has noted that she has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” that 9 Chapter 3 Military Capabilities of Taiwan and Military Balance between China and Taiwan 1 Relations with China 8 conducted an operations drills, including joint livefire drills, in the sea and airspace surrounding the southwest and southeast of Taiwan Island, explaining that the purpose of the drills was “solemn response to the interference of foreign forces and the provocation of ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionists.” It has been pointed out that this was an activity to contain the United States and Taiwan in conjunction with the announcement date of the “August 17 Communiqué,”8 which was agreed upon between the United States and China in 1982. In this way, in recent years, cases have emerged in which the Chinese side sends a message that it is conducting landing and power projection exercises in the sea and airspace around Taiwan as a form of containing Taiwan and the international community. Due to these increasing military activities by China in the vicinity of Taiwan and the response from the Taiwanese side to the situation, the possibility of military tension between China and Taiwan to become further heightened cannot be denied. While the Biden administration is clarifying its stance of supporting Taiwan in the military-related area, in the same way as the former Trump administration, it is deemed unlikely that China, which position Taiwan as its core interests, will show a compromising attitude towards the U.S. stance. It is viewed that the U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan may become more apparent. Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important not only for Japan’s security but also for the stability of the international community. Therefore, it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation with a sense of crisis more than ever before. Defense Policies of Countries strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations and other matters. Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2022, passed by the U.S. Congress in December of the same year, clearly stated a stance of strengthening U.S. support for maintaining Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities, and included an invitation to Taiwan to participate in the 2022 RIMPAC and support for improvement of Taiwan’s asymmetric military capabilities. In response, China has further increased its military activities in the vicinity of Taiwan. In particular, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, there has been an increase in Chinese military aircraft entering Taiwan’s southwest airspace since September 2020. According to announcements by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, a total of approximately 380 Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s southwestern airspace during 2020, and a total of over 970 aircraft entered the southwestern airspace in 2021. In the four-day period from October 1 to 4, the same year, a total of 149 Chinese military aircraft, including fighters and bombers, entered Taiwan’s southwestern airspace. Furthermore, since 2021, China has been diversifying its assets entering this airspace by dispatching conventional fighter and bomber aircraft as well as attack helicopters, aerial refueling tankers, and other aircraft. Through a series of activities, China seems to be seeking to put military pressure on Taiwan and the international community, conduct a war of attrition against Taiwan on a routine basis, and improve its actual combat capabilities in addition to training, intelligence gathering, and surveillance. In addition, on August 17, the same year, China’s Eastern Theater Command announced that it had China claims as embodying the “One-China” principle.9 In response, China has criticized the Democratic Progressive Party for destroying the political foundation of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations by rejecting the “1992 Consensus” unilaterally, emphasizing A document jointly issued by the U.S. and Chinese governments in 1982 stating that the U.S. government would not carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, based on the position that the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged China’s position that Taiwan is part of China. The “1992 Consensus” refers to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. In addition, Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.” DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 70

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