Relations between the United States and China, etc. Section 3
3
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic
Progressive Party, who took office in 2016, has noted
that she has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” that
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Chapter
3
Military Capabilities of Taiwan and Military Balance between China and Taiwan
1 Relations with China
8
conducted an operations drills, including joint livefire drills, in the sea and airspace surrounding the
southwest and southeast of Taiwan Island, explaining
that the purpose of the drills was “solemn response to
the interference of foreign forces and the provocation
of ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionists.” It has been
pointed out that this was an activity to contain the
United States and Taiwan in conjunction with the
announcement date of the “August 17 Communiqué,”8
which was agreed upon between the United States and
China in 1982.
In this way, in recent years, cases have emerged
in which the Chinese side sends a message that it is
conducting landing and power projection exercises in the
sea and airspace around Taiwan as a form of containing
Taiwan and the international community. Due to these
increasing military activities by China in the vicinity
of Taiwan and the response from the Taiwanese side to
the situation, the possibility of military tension between
China and Taiwan to become further heightened cannot
be denied.
While the Biden administration is clarifying its
stance of supporting Taiwan in the military-related area,
in the same way as the former Trump administration,
it is deemed unlikely that China, which position
Taiwan as its core interests, will show a compromising
attitude towards the U.S. stance. It is viewed that the
U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan may become more
apparent. Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan
is important not only for Japan’s security but also for
the stability of the international community. Therefore,
it is necessary that we pay close attention to the situation
with a sense of crisis more than ever before.
Defense Policies of Countries
strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relations and other matters.
Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2022, passed by the U.S. Congress in
December of the same year, clearly stated a stance of
strengthening U.S. support for maintaining Taiwan’s
self-defense capabilities, and included an invitation to
Taiwan to participate in the 2022 RIMPAC and support
for improvement of Taiwan’s asymmetric military
capabilities.
In response, China has further increased its military
activities in the vicinity of Taiwan. In particular,
according to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense,
there has been an increase in Chinese military
aircraft entering Taiwan’s southwest airspace since
September 2020. According to announcements by
Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, a total of
approximately 380 Chinese military aircraft entered
Taiwan’s southwestern airspace during 2020, and a total
of over 970 aircraft entered the southwestern airspace
in 2021. In the four-day period from October 1 to 4,
the same year, a total of 149 Chinese military aircraft,
including fighters and bombers, entered Taiwan’s
southwestern airspace. Furthermore, since 2021, China
has been diversifying its assets entering this airspace by
dispatching conventional fighter and bomber aircraft as
well as attack helicopters, aerial refueling tankers, and
other aircraft. Through a series of activities, China seems
to be seeking to put military pressure on Taiwan and
the international community, conduct a war of attrition
against Taiwan on a routine basis, and improve its actual
combat capabilities in addition to training, intelligence
gathering, and surveillance.
In addition, on August 17, the same year, China’s
Eastern Theater Command announced that it had
China claims as embodying the “One-China” principle.9
In response, China has criticized the Democratic
Progressive Party for destroying the political foundation
of the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations by
rejecting the “1992 Consensus” unilaterally, emphasizing
A document jointly issued by the U.S. and Chinese governments in 1982 stating that the U.S. government would not carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, based on the position
that the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged China’s position that Taiwan is part of China.
The “1992 Consensus” refers to what represents a common understanding reached between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities in 1992 on the “One-China” principle. The CCP and Taiwan’s
Kuomintang Nationalist Party (Taiwan’s ruling party at the time), viewed as parties to the consensus, have reportedly differed over the interpretation of the consensus. In addition, Taiwan’s
Democratic Progressive Party has clarified that it has not accepted the “1992 Consensus.”
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