China Section 2
its “Belt and Road” Initiative (BRI) whose main purpose is
advertised as establishing an economic zone in regions
including the Eurasian continent, with the Chinese military
possibly taking on the role of the shield behind the
initiative by such means as the stabilization of areas via
counter-piracy activities and the improvement of counterterrorism capabilities in coastal states through bilateral and
multilateral exercises. While it is thought that the initiative
includes a strategic intention to expand its influence in the
region, it is possible that the initiative will further improve
the PLA’s operational capabilities in the Indian Ocean,
Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. For example, China’s support
for the construction of port infrastructure in Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh and other Indian Ocean countries as
well as Pacific island countries including Vanuatu could
lead China to secure outposts available for its military
purposes.
(6) Objectives of Activities in Waters and Airspace
KEY WORD
“Belt and Road” Initiative
A concept for an economic sphere proposed by President Xi Jinping.
The “Silk Road Economic Belt” (“One Belt”) and the “21st Century
Maritime Silk Road” (“One Road”) were announced in September
and October 2013, respectively. Since then, the two concepts are
collectively referred to as the “Belt and Road” Initiative.
directions.
The third is to weaken the control of other countries on
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
The development and activities of Chinese naval and
air forces, descriptions in defense white papers, China’s
geographical conditions and globalizing economy, and
other factors indicate that the recent water and airspace
activities of the Navy, Air Force and other Chinese
organizations have the following objectives:
The first is to intercept operations by adversaries in
waters and airspace as far as possible from China in order to
defend its territorial land, waters and airspace. Behind this
objective is an increase in the effectiveness of long-range
attacks due to recent progress in science and technology.
The second is to develop capabilities to deter and
prevent Taiwan’s independence. China maintains that
it will not allow any foreign intervention in solving the
Taiwan issue and realizing the unification of China. To
ensure the prevention of foreign intervention in the Taiwan
issue, China needs to enhance its operational capabilities at
sea and airspace as Taiwan is surrounded by the sea in all
islands subject to China’s territorial claims and enhance
the claims through various surveillance activities and use
of force in waters and airspace surrounding these islands.
Such activities are considered to also have the purpose
of creating a fait accompli as part of the reasons for
unilaterally changing the status quo and justifying China’s
claims based on its own concept of “legal warfare.”
The fourth is to acquire, maintain, and protect its
maritime rights and interests. China is engaged in oil and
gas drilling as well as building facilities and surveying in
the East and South China Seas. It has been confirmed that
in addition to the existing four platforms, China has built
12 additional offshore platforms on the Chinese side of
the Japan-China median line of the East China Sea since
June 2013, and was also confirmed to be moving toward
installing a new structure in May 2022 as well. In late
June 2016, the installment of an anti-surface vessel radar
and a surveillance camera was confirmed on one of the
platforms. Attention is to be paid to matters regarding the
platforms, including the purpose of such equipment. Japan
has repeatedly lodged protests against China’s unilateral
development and demanded the termination of such work.
The fifth is to defend its sea lanes of communications.
In the background is the fact that its sea lanes, including its
oil transportation routes from the Middle East, are essential
for the Chinese economy. Given the recent strengthening
of the Chinese Navy and Air Force, it is believed that they
have been expanding military capabilities to cover distant
waters beyond China’s near seas.
Given these objectives of China’s water and airspace
activities and recent trends, it is believed that China plans
to further expand the sphere of its activities, and further
intensify its operations in waters surrounding Japan,
including the East China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, as well
as in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.
Meanwhile, in recent years, China has shown interest in
taking steps to avoid and prevent unexpected contingencies
in sea areas and airspace. For example, in April 2014,
China, together with other countries such as Japan and the
United States, adopted the Code for Unplanned Encounters
at Sea (CUES), which sets forth the standards of behavior
in the case that the naval vessels or aircraft of the Western
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) member states have
unexpected encounters. Also, in June 2018, Japan and
China started the implementation of their Maritime and
Air Communication Mechanism between the Defense
Authorities to avoid unexpected collisions between SDF
and PLA vessels and aircraft.
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