A/76/135
characteristics and concerns, while inter-regional exchanges allow for mutual
learning between such organizations. States are encouraged to continue this work, as
well as actively engage with those States not currently members of a relevant regional
or sub-regional organization.
81. To continue strengthening cooperative measures relevant to national computer
emergency response teams and other authorized bodies, States could enco urage the
sharing and dissemination of information and good practices on establishing and
sustaining national CERTs/CSIRTs and on incident management through existing
regional and global emergency response organizations and networks. Such
encouragement and support for CERTs/CSIRTs would also serve to raise awareness
among States of their commitments with regard to CERTs/CSIRTs and other related
bodies under norm 13 (k).
Transparency measures
82. Exercising transparency on a voluntary basis through the exchange of national
views and practices on ICT security incidents and other related threats and by making
ICT security advice, guidance, evidence base and data supporting decisions publicly
available is important for building trust and predictability, reducing the possibility of
misinterpretation and escalation, and helping organizations and agencies make good
risk management decisions.
83. To further advance transparency and predictability of State behaviour, provide
exposure to a wider range of views and experiences and enhance State preparedness and
early awareness of growing threats, States could consider using bilateral, sub -regional,
regional and multilateral fora and informal consultations to voluntarily share:
information and good practices, lessons or white papers on existing and emerging ICT
security-related threats and incidents; national strategies and standards for
vulnerability analysis of ICT products; and national and regional approaches to risk
management and conflict prevention, including national approaches to classifying
ICT incidents in terms of the scale and seriousness of the incident.
84. States can also avail of these existing fora to clarify positions and voluntarily
exchange information on: national approaches to ICT security; data protection; the
protection of ICT-enabled critical infrastructure; and ICT-security agency mission and
functions, and ICT strategy at the national or organizational level, and the legal and
oversight regimes under which they operate.
85. The recommendations on CBMs in previous GGE reports provide a cooperative
basis for addressing growing threats to critical infrastructure -related challenges and
for implementing the relevant norms. States are encouraged to continue raising
awareness on the importance of critical infrastructure protection, promoting
information sharing among critical infrastructure stakeholders and sharing of good
practices and guidance. Where appropriate, they can use existing platforms and
reporting modalities (see paragraph 86) to voluntarily share national views on the
classification of critical national infrastructure and critical infrastructure providing
essential services regionally or internationally, relevant national policies and
legislation, and frameworks for risk assessment and for identifying, classifying and
managing ICT incidents affecting critical infrastructure.
86. States could also use United Nations resources such as voluntary reporting to
the Secretary-General, the Cyber Policy Portal of the United Nations Inst itute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), as well as the resources of other relevant
international and regional organizations to consolidate information and good
practices provided voluntarily by States on national strategies, policies, legislation
and programmes that address ICT security issues relevant to international security
and stability.
20/26
21-04030
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