When Secure Boot is active, the UEFI firmware is
responsible for verifying components such as drivers and
bootloader. At commissioning, the device is initially placed
in Setup Mode, which allows a public part of a Platform Key
(PK) to be written to the firmware. The private part of the PK
is used to sign a Key Exchange Key (KEK) which protects a
signature database. Following this, Secure Boot enters
User Mode, where only drivers and loaders whose
signatures match the database can be loaded by the
firmware. If an invalid binary is loaded while Secure Boot is
enabled, the user is alerted, and the system will refuse to
boot with the tampered binary. Additional signatures can be
added to the database, but they must be signed by the
private part of the KEK.
While Secure Boot mitigates the problem of untrusted
firmware, care must be taken in system design to protect
secure boot databases. In addition, vendors must develop
security processes to protect various signing keys and to
sign only approved payloads218.
66
internet-connected devices that can be updated, controlled,
monitored, and maintained remotely. 220 Specifically, the
MCU’s Pluton Security Subsystem generates its own key
pairs, implements a true random number generator (RNG),
and accelerates cryptographic operations,221 enabling
measured boot as well as remote attestation.
Local Device Storage
Stored data should always be protected with encryption222.
Of course, a technique commonly used in IoT is to not store
data locally but send it to a server where it can be easily
encrypted. Having said that, some devices incorporate local
self-encrypting drives (SEDs) that provide confidentiality
while being easy to use and manage and having minimal
impact on system performance. At the most basic level,
SEDs provide hardware-based data security by continuously
scrambling data using a key as it is written to the drive, and
then descrambling the data as it is retrieved. The contents
of an SED are always encrypted, and the encryption keys
are themselves encrypted and protected in hardware that
cannot be accessed by other parts of the system.
Seven Properties of Highly Secured Devices
Microsoft Research has identified seven properties219 that
highly secured devices need to have: hardware based rootof-trust, small trusted computing base, defence in depth,
compartmentalisation, certificate-based authentication,
security renewal, and failure reporting. Microsoft’s Azure
Sphere platform is designed around these properties,
offering a secured, connected, crossover microcontroller
unit (MCU), a custom high-level Linux-based operating
system (OS), and a cloud-based security service.
The Azure Sphere MCU, along with its operating system and
application platform, enables the creation of secured,
The SED standards223 from TCG enable encryption to be
built into drives, improving security while avoiding the
overhead of software encryption and ensuring that
equipment can be cleansed for reuse simply by telling the
drive to change its key. As with TPM, the SED standard is
available in a wide variety of interoperable products,
including hard drives, solid state drives, hybrid drives and
enterprise storage systems, from a variety of vendors.
SEDs are already in use in a number of devices, including
printers, copiers and multi-function devices as well as point
of sale systems.
218 http://www.rtcgroup.com/whitepapers/files/Insyde_Embedded_Secure_Boot.
pdf
219 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/
SevenPropertiesofHighlySecureDevices.pdf
220 https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure-sphere/product-overview/
what-is-azure-sphere
221 https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/anatomy-of-a-secured-mcu/
222 https://www.gemalto.com/enterprise-security/enterprise-data-encryption
223 https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/
storage-work-group-storage-security-subsystem-class-opal/
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