NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021 At the end of 2020, the so-called SolarWinds campaignVI was discovered (see also the Retrospective). Here, an actor compromised software in ICT supply chains in various ways. Where attacks appeared to be targeted in the past, they appear to be widely used by the actor. This campaign potentially had a much greater impact than previously recognised supply chain attacks. The vulnerability in SolarWinds' Orion product, which was initially introduced by the actor, has not only been exploited at various US government agencies. Several cybersecurity and tech companies with global customers, such as FireEye, Mimecast and Microsoft, have also reported being compromised via the vulnerable version of Orion. Had the compromised version not been discovered, the actor could have affected many more organisations globally. Supply chain attack on Codecov development environment Codecov, based in San Francisco, reported in a statement that one or more hackers began tampering with software used in the tech industry on 31 January to test code for errors and vulnerabilities. The attacker(s) managed to gain access to Codecov's development environment and succeeded in hiding malware in a company script. In this way, the attacker(s) were able to steal passwords, tokens and keys from customers. Codecov warned that the attacker(s) could potentially export information stored on customers' CI environmentsVII. The hack was discovered on 1 April 2021 when a customer noticed something was wrong with the script. Codecov states on its website that it has 29,000 customers, including Procter & Gamble Co, web hosting company GoDaddy Inc, The Washington Post and Australian software company Atlassian Corporation PLC. How many companies actually fell victim to the Codecov hack is not known. Security experts involved in the case stated that the scale of the attack and the skills required are similar to the SolarWinds attack (see the Review). Other companies could potentially be compromised via Codecov customers. The attackers apparently went to extra lengths to gain access to other software developers and technical services companies through Codecov. VI Although this campaign is referred to in the media as the 'SolarWinds campaign', this is not an accurate description because almost a third of the organisations affected by the actor had no direct connection with SolarWinds. See https://www.securityweek.com/cisa-says-many-victims-solarwinds-hackers-hadno-direct-link-solarwinds. VII CI is short for continuous integration. ‘Continuous Integration is a software development process where developers integrate the new code they've written more frequently throughout the development cycle [....] Continuous Integration helps streamline the build process, resulting in higher-quality software and more predictable delivery schedules.’ https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/continuousintegration. 36 Violation of certain global ICT supply chains can have an impact on national security by, for example, causing critical processes to become unavailable or to malfunction for longer or shorter periods of time. In such a scenario, organisations can no longer perform critical tasks such as distributing energy, carrying out financial transactions or providing education (or their performance may be more limited). Sensitive or vulnerable personal, economic or political information could become accessible to malicious parties. This could harm the Dutch economy or put the Netherlands at a disadvantage in international negotiations. Besides this direct impact, violations of cyberspace also have a wider impact. For example, a great deal of capacity and money must be devoted to investigating misuse and remedying it. In some cases, an entire infrastructure of organisations must be rebuilt. In the meantime, the extent to which actors are still present within the infrastructure of organisations and whether misuse is still possible is unknown. This may mean that analogue processes, which are often lacking or which may result in higher costs, must be used again. Violation can also affect the trust of members of the public and organisations in digital processes and possibly hinder further digitisation. Boosting resilience against violation of ICT supply chains is limited in practice. Digital processes are intertwined with and make use of various complex chains. There is a lot of ‘low-hanging fruit’ for attackers that organisations are not always aware of until things go wrong. If there is any risk assessment of third parties, it does not guarantee that they will not be misused indirectly. Moreover, nobody bears full responsibility for the security of the entire chain and the chain is not transparent. Within this framework, cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier said: ‘We can't trust anyone, yet we have no choice but to trust everyone’. Back to Table of Contents

Select target paragraph3

Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents