NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021
At the end of 2020, the so-called SolarWinds campaignVI was
discovered (see also the Retrospective). Here, an actor
compromised software in ICT supply chains in various ways. Where
attacks appeared to be targeted in the past, they appear to be
widely used by the actor. This campaign potentially had a much
greater impact than previously recognised supply chain attacks.
The vulnerability in SolarWinds' Orion product, which was initially
introduced by the actor, has not only been exploited at various US
government agencies. Several cybersecurity and tech companies
with global customers, such as FireEye, Mimecast and Microsoft,
have also reported being compromised via the vulnerable version
of Orion. Had the compromised version not been discovered, the
actor could have affected many more organisations globally.
Supply chain attack on Codecov development
environment
Codecov, based in San Francisco, reported in a statement that one
or more hackers began tampering with software used in the tech
industry on 31 January to test code for errors and vulnerabilities.
The attacker(s) managed to gain access to Codecov's development
environment and succeeded in hiding malware in a company
script. In this way, the attacker(s) were able to steal passwords,
tokens and keys from customers. Codecov warned that the
attacker(s) could potentially export information stored on
customers' CI environmentsVII. The hack was discovered on 1 April
2021 when a customer noticed something was wrong with the
script. Codecov states on its website that it has 29,000 customers,
including Procter & Gamble Co, web hosting company GoDaddy
Inc, The Washington Post and Australian software company
Atlassian Corporation PLC. How many companies actually fell
victim to the Codecov hack is not known. Security experts involved
in the case stated that the scale of the attack and the skills required
are similar to the SolarWinds attack (see the Review). Other
companies could potentially be compromised via Codecov
customers. The attackers apparently went to extra lengths to gain
access to other software developers and technical services
companies through Codecov.
VI
Although this campaign is referred to in the media as the 'SolarWinds campaign',
this is not an accurate description because almost a third of the organisations
affected by the actor had no direct connection with SolarWinds. See
https://www.securityweek.com/cisa-says-many-victims-solarwinds-hackers-hadno-direct-link-solarwinds.
VII CI is short for continuous integration. ‘Continuous Integration is a software
development process where developers integrate the new code they've written
more frequently throughout the development cycle [....] Continuous Integration
helps streamline the build process, resulting in higher-quality software and more
predictable delivery schedules.’ https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/continuousintegration.
36
Violation of certain global ICT supply chains can have an impact on
national security by, for example, causing critical processes to
become unavailable or to malfunction for longer or shorter
periods of time. In such a scenario, organisations can no longer
perform critical tasks such as distributing energy, carrying out
financial transactions or providing education (or their performance
may be more limited). Sensitive or vulnerable personal, economic
or political information could become accessible to malicious
parties. This could harm the Dutch economy or put the
Netherlands at a disadvantage in international negotiations.
Besides this direct impact, violations of cyberspace also have a
wider impact. For example, a great deal of capacity and money
must be devoted to investigating misuse and remedying it. In some
cases, an entire infrastructure of organisations must be rebuilt. In
the meantime, the extent to which actors are still present within
the infrastructure of organisations and whether misuse is still
possible is unknown. This may mean that analogue processes,
which are often lacking or which may result in higher costs, must
be used again. Violation can also affect the trust of members of the
public and organisations in digital processes and possibly hinder
further digitisation.
Boosting resilience against violation of ICT supply chains is limited
in practice. Digital processes are intertwined with and make use of
various complex chains. There is a lot of ‘low-hanging fruit’ for
attackers that organisations are not always aware of until things go
wrong. If there is any risk assessment of third parties, it does not
guarantee that they will not be misused indirectly. Moreover,
nobody bears full responsibility for the security of the entire chain
and the chain is not transparent. Within this framework,
cybersecurity expert Bruce Schneier said: ‘We can't trust anyone, yet
we have no choice but to trust everyone’.
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