Chapter 6 Geopolitics influences threats and interests | CSAN 2021 6 Geopolitics influences threats and interests Domestic relations and relations between states determine the interests that states promote and the objectives that they pursue. This creates a geopolitical force field that is in motion and also makes itself felt in cyberspace. State actors use their instruments to promote their interests there as well. And sometimes that promotion of interests poses a threat to the national security interests of others, as evidenced by the Threat Assessment for State Actors from the AIVD, MIVD and NCTV. The threat is evolving Motives of state actors vary The threat posed by state actors is nothing new; it has been developing for some time. Sometimes it becomes more vague, sometimes more manifest. This is not only due to geopolitical shifts, such as the emergence of new powers that question the post-war international order or the renewed assertiveness of established powers. The tools also change. This makes the threat emanating from state actors towards Dutch society diverse and complex. The increased digitisation and technological possibilities increase the risks involved. The motives of state actors for deploying resources in or against other states vary. To a large extent, it is a matter of promoting domestic political and security interests. Think of combating dissidents living abroad. An important driving force here is the desire to preserve the status quo in the country of origin: including the existing state structure, role and position of the head of state and role and position of the nationals (both at home and abroad). Although activities related to this are not directly directed against the Netherlands or our allies, they can certainly harm our interests. Different states engage in a wide range of activities in pursuit of their interests. They can use all means available to them within their government's remit to do so. Their activities may affect our national security. The threat comes both from state actors with a different strategic agenda and from state actors with a different political system to the Netherlands. The threat can manifest itself directly or through proxies; this term refers to third parties used by state actors. In recent years, concrete manifestations of threats have been observed from various states. Influencing and interference activities, espionage and information confrontation are common practices. In information confrontation, the information domain, including media, social media and platforms, is seen as a battle arena and information is used as a weapon to inflict harm. State actors also use economic instruments to achieve geopolitical goals. Even activities that few state actors engage in, such as preparations for and actual sabotage, can have potentially serious consequences for national security. Other motives are often financial and economic. Here, too, the preservation of the status quo in the country of origin plays a major role. The diaspora (people living outside the country of origin) is a source of income, making investments (such as the purchase of real estate) and providing financial support to family members left behind. Notable examples are those states for which engaging in illegal digital activities has become a revenue model. For example, North Korea derives a significant proportion of its state revenue from illegal digital activities such as ransomware attacks against international companies and cyber theft. Economic espionage also plays a large part, with which state actors aim to improve their own competitive position, for example, or to acquire high-quality knowledge and technology without having to incur the costs of research and development themselves. Illustrative of this is Chinese economic espionage, which primarily focuses on technology theft and insider information on proposed investments. 39

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