NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021
In the third group of motives, foreign relations play a more
emphatic role. This involves, for example, strengthening the
strategic-military position in relation to other states. For example,
Iran, Syria, North Korea and Pakistan are looking to the
Netherlands and other Western countries for the knowledge and
goods they need to develop their programmes for weapons of mass
destruction and delivery systems. Other motives include: obtaining
political information about government positions and decisionmaking processes of other states; or influencing
political-administrative processes in other states. These motives
may lead to the development of all kinds of activities that harm
Dutch interests, such as espionage, but also covert political
influence, influencing and intimidating the diaspora, sabotage and
misuse of the Dutch ICT infrastructure. Previous CSANs have
already warned of increasing activities aimed at facilitating the
sabotage of critical infrastructures in Europe (in the future).
Suppliers of critical processes have also been successfully attacked
in recent years. By implicitly or explicitly threatening disruption or
sabotage, actors can exert economic, political, diplomatic or
military influence on the target. The threat of possible disruption
and sabotage is therefore a means of influencing decision-making
processes.
Cyberspace offers a wealth of options
Cyberspace is particularly suitable for promoting the interests
behind these diverse motives. Firstly, because with increased
digitisation and the Internet of Things, almost every target is
digitally accessible and access to targets is also relatively easy and
low-threshold. In addition, attribution to a state actor is difficult,
so there is a low risk of incurring damage when using digital
resources. Moreover, it is significantly cheaper and less risky than
using other means, as it is not particularly time- and labourintensive, and tools and methods can be reused. Finally, digital
operations are more flexibly scalable than physical operations and
the return from them has grown significantly. Thus, the costbenefit analysis is favourable.
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Virtually any country with basic capabilities and the intention of
digital penetration will be able to do this successfully at various
organisations in the Netherlands. This says something about
resilience, which still falls short in various organisations (see also
the Core CSAN). Studies reveal that states such as China, Russia and
Iran have offensive cyber programmes targeting the Netherlands.
This shows both the capacity and intention to penetrate Dutch
organisations. In fact, the cyber capabilities, knowledge and
expertise of China and Russia are so extensive that there is a good
chance they will succeed in penetrating anywhere digitally. In open
sources, cybersecurity companies report an increase in offensive
cyber activities by states not previously known for their cyber
capabilities, such as India, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Ethiopia and Sudan. These states partly develop these
capabilities themselves or outsource cyber operations to third
parties. For example, the emergence of new cyber actors goes hand
in hand with the rise of 'hackers for hire', advanced hacker groups
that hire out their (often espionage) services to governments or
wealthy clients. The activities of new cyber actors and hacker-forhire groups can also affect Dutch interests. For example, in a
conflict situation, a country or actor group can suddenly, or also,
start focusing on the Netherlands.
An important question here is to what extent this
'democratisation' of cyber capabilities also affects the geopolitical
intentions of state actors. The fact that states initially did not have
capabilities in cyberspace but now do, may lead them to behave
differently. After all, it offers them opportunities they did not have
before, such as monitoring dissidents living abroad or cyber attacks
on other states with which they are in conflict. It is conceivable
that the growing range of instruments available will also lead to a
reconsideration of one's own geopolitical power.
Means and targets
State actors have a wide range of means at their disposal to achieve
their objectives, with each actor having its own specific goal and
modus operandi. Some of them are not necessarily illegal or even
undesirable. And not all state actors have the same capabilities.
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