NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021 In the third group of motives, foreign relations play a more emphatic role. This involves, for example, strengthening the strategic-military position in relation to other states. For example, Iran, Syria, North Korea and Pakistan are looking to the Netherlands and other Western countries for the knowledge and goods they need to develop their programmes for weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. Other motives include: obtaining political information about government positions and decisionmaking processes of other states; or influencing political-administrative processes in other states. These motives may lead to the development of all kinds of activities that harm Dutch interests, such as espionage, but also covert political influence, influencing and intimidating the diaspora, sabotage and misuse of the Dutch ICT infrastructure. Previous CSANs have already warned of increasing activities aimed at facilitating the sabotage of critical infrastructures in Europe (in the future). Suppliers of critical processes have also been successfully attacked in recent years. By implicitly or explicitly threatening disruption or sabotage, actors can exert economic, political, diplomatic or military influence on the target. The threat of possible disruption and sabotage is therefore a means of influencing decision-making processes. Cyberspace offers a wealth of options Cyberspace is particularly suitable for promoting the interests behind these diverse motives. Firstly, because with increased digitisation and the Internet of Things, almost every target is digitally accessible and access to targets is also relatively easy and low-threshold. In addition, attribution to a state actor is difficult, so there is a low risk of incurring damage when using digital resources. Moreover, it is significantly cheaper and less risky than using other means, as it is not particularly time- and labourintensive, and tools and methods can be reused. Finally, digital operations are more flexibly scalable than physical operations and the return from them has grown significantly. Thus, the costbenefit analysis is favourable. 40 Virtually any country with basic capabilities and the intention of digital penetration will be able to do this successfully at various organisations in the Netherlands. This says something about resilience, which still falls short in various organisations (see also the Core CSAN). Studies reveal that states such as China, Russia and Iran have offensive cyber programmes targeting the Netherlands. This shows both the capacity and intention to penetrate Dutch organisations. In fact, the cyber capabilities, knowledge and expertise of China and Russia are so extensive that there is a good chance they will succeed in penetrating anywhere digitally. In open sources, cybersecurity companies report an increase in offensive cyber activities by states not previously known for their cyber capabilities, such as India, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Ethiopia and Sudan. These states partly develop these capabilities themselves or outsource cyber operations to third parties. For example, the emergence of new cyber actors goes hand in hand with the rise of 'hackers for hire', advanced hacker groups that hire out their (often espionage) services to governments or wealthy clients. The activities of new cyber actors and hacker-forhire groups can also affect Dutch interests. For example, in a conflict situation, a country or actor group can suddenly, or also, start focusing on the Netherlands. An important question here is to what extent this 'democratisation' of cyber capabilities also affects the geopolitical intentions of state actors. The fact that states initially did not have capabilities in cyberspace but now do, may lead them to behave differently. After all, it offers them opportunities they did not have before, such as monitoring dissidents living abroad or cyber attacks on other states with which they are in conflict. It is conceivable that the growing range of instruments available will also lead to a reconsideration of one's own geopolitical power. Means and targets State actors have a wide range of means at their disposal to achieve their objectives, with each actor having its own specific goal and modus operandi. Some of them are not necessarily illegal or even undesirable. And not all state actors have the same capabilities.

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