NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021 Espionage, sabotage and outages have already been extensively discussed in the CSAN 2020. The risks associated with this (risks 1, 2 and 4) are still relevant. Espionage and sabotage are also explained in detail in the publication ‘State Actors Threat Assessment’. This CSAN discusses risks 2 (specifically ransomware, chapter 4) and 3 (breaches of cyberspace, chapter 5) in detail. Looking back: Netherlands hit by wide range of cyber incidents In the period from March 2020 to March 2021, there were numerous cyber incidents in or relating to the Netherlands. Malicious parties especially exploited the current issue of COVID-19 to carry out attacks. Remote working services were also the target of attacks. In addition, processes with a digital component were made inaccessible and organisations in supply chains were attacked. There were many incidents where large amounts of vulnerable business and privacy-sensitive information were made public. Lastly, unintentional failures led to outages. The various incidents are discussed in detail in chapter 2 ’Retrospective’. Threat continues to evolve COVID-19 exploited to carry out attacks While the COVID-19 pandemic also led to social disruption in the Netherlands, the digitisation of Dutch society enabled resilience and continuity. Society has become even more digitised as a result of the pandemic. Thanks to IT, commercial, educational and social activities that threatened to come to a halt could continue, at least in part. This places heavy demands on cyberspace, which has become even more important to the functioning of society. The pandemic has also led to shifts in the threat assessment. Actors seize on current issues that dominate headlines worldwide to carry out digital attacks. This also holds true for COVID-19. For example, many phishing emails from cybercriminals and state actors last year exploited COVID-19. Current events have also given rise to an intelligence need among state actors. In relation to COVID-19, a need for knowledge about vaccines arose, which resulted in digital espionage and even the spreading of disinformation. Disinformation around current issues such as the pandemic can lead to polarisation because it fuels and magnifies differences of opinion. One example of this is whether or not people trust vaccines against COVID-19. It is conceivable that polarisation will also get a digital component. For example, opponents of the COVID-19 restrictions could express their dissatisfaction by disrupting digital processes, such as by launching DDoS attacks against public authorities or parties with different ideas. They might also try to hack into public authorities to get information that could put an authority in a bad light. 8 In the Netherlands, the pandemic has also led to increased attention to risks and the (accelerated) implementation of resilience-enhancing measures by companies and organisations, for example in education. To what extent the initiatives to increase resilience now and in the near future will be sufficient to curb the evolving threat is difficult to assess. However, at present it does not appear that the threat has been brought fully under control (see below under ‘Resilience’). Chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’ describes a number of cyber incidents that occurred around COVID-19 in and in relation to the Netherlands. Chapter 3 explains how the pandemic, as the most important current issue, has affected the threat assessment. Attacks can cause long-term damage to organisations and chains The impact of digital attacks varies. Some, such as DDoS attacks, lead to short-term disruption of processes, paralysing websites for a few hours. Other types of attacks, such as ransomware attacks, have a long-term impact. Cybercriminals take time to infiltrate victims’ networks, to find out how they can achieve maximum disruption of processes and determine what would be an ‘appropriate’ (i.e. realistic) ransom amount. They often spend long periods unseen in a network. They further increase the impact of their attack by also rendering system backups unusable. In extreme cases, the damage to systems is so severe that repair is impossible. Then the only option left is to rebuild systems from scratch (which sometimes even requires regathering lost data). When various means of pressure are used, ransomware attacks can also have a long-term impact on processes. In addition to making processes inaccessible, the aim is to steal information, which the actor then makes public or threatens to make public. Attackers can go a step further by trying to extort their target’s customers. This can happen quickly, or only after some time, in which case victims of a ransomware attack may have to deal with the consequences of the original attack for a long time. Attacks with a long-term impact on processes are not only launched by cybercriminals, but also by state actors. They use backdoors to gain access to networks, for example, and remain there unseen for a long time. Meanwhile, they explore the systems and create new access points. In the case of the SolarWinds campaign, for example, it was found that the Russian state actor behind the attack had been inside the system for over a year before being detected (see chapter 2 ‘Retrospective’). Furthermore, it has been established that state actors launch targeted attacks against cybersecurity companies and individual security researchers. This gives them insight into the working methods of these security companies and researchers and into any weaknesses in the security of their customers. Actors can then use this knowledge to launch new attacks.

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