NCTV | Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 2021
managing risks are: identification of relevant risks, prevention by
implementing measures, detection of repulsed and successful
attacks, mitigation of the impact of a successful attack, and repair
to restore full operation of a process. Communication with
stakeholders, including feedback to management, plays an
important role in evaluating the effectiveness of the process. In
addition to the aforementioned activities, overarching aspects are
increasingly evident in a broader view of risk management.
Regulation from the market and government - such as insurance,
certification and liability - plays an increasingly important role.
This also applies to governance, realistic testing, situational
awareness and learning from mistakes. These different facets of
risk management should reinforce each other: risk management is
a continuous process with the aim of ensuring that risks are clearly
and unambiguously identified and actually reduced.
Resilience is a team effort
Traditionally, the management of technology-related risks has
been entrusted to the ICT department. This widens the gap
between technical experts and the business. Instead, risk
management can be seen as a team affair. Management of cyber
risks should be done in consultation with the business, involving
parties such as business continuity managers, risk managers,
process owners and domain experts. Examples of where this has
not happened show that basic problems can otherwise fall between
two stools. Furthermore, in addition to the importance of good
cooperation between disciplines, cooperation between the
different layers of an organisation is essential. The exploration and
management of strategic, tactical and operational risks should be
well coordinated.
Scenarios provoke thought
‘Prevention and cure’ as an adage
A balanced approach to cyber risks is not just about reacting to
incidents or rolling out measures to stop attacks. Instead, a
nuanced view of the problem is needed. It must be accepted that
there is no such thing as airtight security and that there will always
be successful attacks. This does not mean that digital dyke
reinforcement is of no use. Such activities can indeed help to parry
attacks and reduce the impact of successful attacks. Detecting
attackers at an early stage and responding quickly, can limit the
damage. At the other end of the spectrum, the 'security by design'
and 'privacy by design' mentality can also be used. The earlier
security issues are included in the development process of a
process, system or service, the cheaper and/or the more impactful
the measures taken will normally be. The challenge is to find the
right balance in this playing field so that risks can be addressed at
an acceptable cost, both in terms of money and in terms of
balancing other interests such as freedom, accessibility and
progress. The 'usable security' field shows that interests do not
have to be mutually exclusive. If problems are identified in good
time in consultation with end users, there is a good chance that an
appropriate trade-off can be made.
Basic principles can be applied widely
Although the establishment of a comprehensive risk management
system in a large organisation may take several years, the
underlying principles are also relevant for smaller organisations.
After all, risk management can be implemented in many different
ways. It is mainly a question of seeing what works in the given
context. Therefore, each organisation is free to design its own
approach to risk management in line with existing obligations. The
following fundamental principles may be helpful in this regard.
44
Risks often remain abstract. For this reason, it may be useful to
translate them into scenarios. Examples of such scenarios are
included in Chapter 8, Threat Scenarios. This kind of scenariodriven way of working makes things tangible, and it makes it easier
to build bridges between different disciplines. A workshop to
introduce people to scenarios could start with everyday examples,
such as ways of breaking into a house. Based on these relatively
simple scenarios, more complex examples can be given, such as
scenarios involving cybercrime. In a next step, even the
perspectives of different disciplines could be added. Apart from
being used for risk identification, these scenarios can also be used
during the other stages of the risk management cycle. They can be
used, for example, in process audits, system testing and incident
response exercises.
Money and uptime are universal benchmarks
In order to be able to compare different scenarios, it is important
to agree on a common interpretation of the concept of risk and to
use the same indicators for multiple risk analyses. This allows risks
to be compared in an informed way. An example of a set of
indicators that is fairly universal is money (or financial impact) and
continuity (or availability). By also using these indicators for other
types of risks, cyber risks can be put on the same footing as, for
example, operational risks. In this way, the crown jewels of an
organisation can be identified by looking at what has the most
impact on revenue and business continuity. These crown jewels can
then be given extra attention, and the security budget can be used
intelligently. In this way, the parts of an organisation that actually
need it are made more resilient. Unfortunately, however, there are
also organisations that carry out risk analyses that leave something
to be desired: risks are often vaguely and sweepingly described, so
that they cannot be adequately explained. This makes it more
difficult to weigh up the effectiveness of measures to protect the
performance of a country or organisation's core tasks. Security is
then quickly seen as a cost item instead of an integral part of
business operations.
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents