Chapter 8 Threat scenarios | CSAN 2021 Further (forensic) investigation is being conducted by Cirrocumulus Networks and a forensic investigation company hired by an affected customer. This reveals that the intrusion can be traced back to the temporary re-routing of the direct connection by NLeX a few weeks earlier when a storm caused a system failure that made NLeX's service temporarily unavailable. When NLeX temporarily switched the direct peering connection of a number of Cirrocumulus Networks customers to an internet connection, a (human) error was made in the confusing, time-sensitive situation, which led to a vulnerability. A malicious actor had surreptitiously exploited this vulnerability, as the malware found in a customer environment appears to have been installed since the time of the extreme weather situation. As more customers may have been affected, Cirrocumulus Networks is notifying all its customers in the affected region as a precaution. Key term (Private) peering connection: a method of routing traffic between devices in two different networks without having to use a third party (ISP) to route the traffic. For example, large organisations use private peering connections to exchange data between different locations in their organisation. For communication with other organisations, organisations use a public peering connection, usually through an ISP that in turn has peering connections with other ISPs. Peering connections between ISPs are often realised in an Internet Exchange. The interconnection of all peering connections forms the Internet. Key questions for the reader It appears that several, but not all, Cirrocumulus Networks customers who were temporarily switched from a direct connection to an internet connection by NLeX during the storm have indeed experienced suspicious activity. There is still much uncertainty about the exact scope of the data that has been stolen, but it is clear that in addition to personal (customer) information, the data of some customers also includes business-sensitive information and sensitive information from some government departments. This information is additional fuel on the fire in the (social) media. Varying speculation from cybersecurity experts make it unclear which organisations have been affected, which have not, and what the consequences of the succession of incidents are. Questions are also asked in Parliament, such as whether the Netherlands has become too dependent on cloud services and whether customers using the services of the CSP, the cloud exchange or the CSP itself are responsible for the damage suffered. 1. Do you have monitoring and detection capacity available or purchased as a service? Are you aware of what exactly is being monitored and what types of threats are and are not being detected? 2. How are the responsibilities allocated between you as the customer and the cloud service provider in the event of an incident? What are the individual and collective responsibilities in this regard? And are they sufficiently coordinated with each other? 3. Are you familiar with or do you use an assume breach strategy? In other words: if it is assumed that your organisation will one day be confronted with a cybersecurity incident, what is your action framework? Scenario part c: operation dust cloud leads to scorched earth Description of events Interpretation Many organisations see moving operations to a public or hybrid cloud environment as a way to increase protection against cyber attacks. For cloud service providers, it is extremely important to ensure the security of their services, and they therefore have a lot of expertise and capacity in the field of cybersecurity. However, this does not mean that cloud environments are infallible. Mistakes can be made and malicious actors are lurking everywhere to exploit vulnerabilities. Incidents such as Solarwinds have shown that organisations can be vulnerable if they depend on an increasingly complex network of software product suppliers or outsourced ICT services. Organisations do not always have a good overview of all the parties that are part of this network, which makes control difficult. An attack on a component in the chain of ICT services can therefore indirectly impact an organisation (supply chain attack, see also the threat scenario of CSAN 2020). A large group of Dutch customers of CSP Cirrocumulus Networks suddenly have no access to their cloud environment. Media reports immediately point to a major infrastructure failure at Cirrocumulus Networks and do not exclude the possibility of an attack. It is of note that this occurs at a time when reports of suspicious activity in the cloud environment of several Cirrocumulus Networks customers have already come to light. A spokesperson for Cirrocumulus Networks indicates that service was indeed disrupted by problems in one of its data centres and that they are working to find the cause and solution. Meanwhile, unrest among Cirrocumulus Networks customers is growing, fuelled by media reports. Are their systems and data still reliable and secure? What's going on? A few hours later, Cirrocumulus announces that there is an advanced attack against one of the company’s data centres in the Netherlands, which has affected some of the Dutch customers. The situation is now under control and Cirrocumulus Networks is doing everything possible to restore service as soon as possible. This can take from a few hours to a few weeks, depending on the specific situation of the affected users. 51

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