112. Ibid. As noted, the Silk Road case is
highlighted in the Toolkit for a number
of reasons. Ibid. More generally, it bears
noting that “dark web” markets—
where drugs, weapons, malware, toxic
chemicals, stolen data and the like are
traded—is unlikely to go away. Rather,
as cyberspace continues to gain both
commercial and social importance, the
place for such dark markets is only likely
to grow. Indeed, by all indications, that
growth is very substantial: recently, two
additional dark web marketplaces—
AlphaBay and Hansa—were shut down by
FBI-led, global police efforts. See Chris
Baraniuk, “AlphaBay and Hansa Dark
Web Markets Shut Down,” BBC News,
(20 Jul. 2017), at http://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-40670010. In terms
of both traffic and value, AlphaBay and
Hansa dwarfed Silk Road: while Silk Road
only had 14,000 listings for illicit items of
various kinds when it was seized in 2013,
the DoJ said that AlphaBay had more
than 350,000 listings, with US$450m was
spent via the marketplace between May
2015 and February 2017. Ibid. While the
impact of shutting down AlphaBay and
Hansa is unclear, there are indications
that trade on several of the other dark
web’s illegal markets has increased,
though the sales of some goods appear
to have been reduced. See, e.g., Leo
Kelion, “Dark Web Markets Boom after
Alphas Bay and Hansa busts,” BBC
News, (1 Aug. 2017), at http://www.bbc.
com/news/technology-40788266. The
growing dark side of cyberspace is a
matter with which society at large will—
constructively and collectively—have to
grapple; fighting cybercrime and assuring
cybersecurity are central elements
therein. See, e.g., Ronald Deibert, “The
Growing Dark Side of Cyberspace (…
and What to Do About It),” Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs,
Vol. 1, Issue 2 (Nov. 2012), at http://
elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1012&context=jlia. For a
provocative, fictional depiction of the role
of cyber exchanges, see Jennifer Haley,
“The Nether”, supra § 1 B, note 7.
113. Tamara Tabo, “United States v. The
Internet: America’s Most Wanted May
Look a Lot Like You,” AbovetheLaw.com,
(12 Jun. 2015), at http://abovethelaw.
com/2015/06/united-states-v-the-internetamericas-most-wanted-may-look-a-lotlike-you/
115. Ibid.
116. See Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott,
“The Impact of the Blockchain Goes
Beyond Financial Services,” Harvard
Business Review (10 May 2016), at
https://hbr.org/2016/05/the-impact-ofthe-blockchain-goes-beyond-financialservices (“where not just information
but anything of value – money, titles,
deeds, music, art, scientific discoveries,
intellectual property, and even votes
– can be moved and stored securely
and privately. On the blockchain,
trust is established, not by powerful
intermediaries like banks, governments
and technology companies, but through
mass collaboration and clever code.
Blockchains ensure integrity and trust
between strangers. They make it difficult
to cheat.”).
117. See, e.g., US Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (see
USC Title 18, §§ 5311–5330 and 31 CFR
Chapter X [formerly 31 CFR Part 103]
(“Bank Secrecy Act” or “BSA”).
118. Ibid., at para. 71.
119. See, e.g., United Kingdom: Computer
Misuse Act 1990, (criminalizing three acts:
(1) Unauthorized access to computer
material; (2) unauthorized access with
intent to commit or facilitate commission
of further offences; (3) unauthorized
modification of computer material),
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1990/18/contents. It should be
noted that amendments to the Computer
Misuse Act were introduced in the
Police and Justice Act 2006, http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/48/part/5/
crossheading/computer-misuse.
120. USC Title 18, § 1030(a)(6)(A) & (B)
121. Ibid., at para. 81.
122. A review of the global state of cybercrime
legislation by the CoE found that only
70% of studied countries had legislation
in place targeting the misuse of devices;
dual use of devices was not considered,
with focus being on the production of
some specific devices; misuse of devices
was found to be criminalized only in
relation with illegal access or system
interference. See Cristina Schulman, “The
Global State of Cybercrime Legislation,”
Workshop 1: Cybercrime legislation
(Strasbourg: Octopus Conference,
6–8 Jun. 2012), at https://rm.coe.
int/16802f240b. See also Geoffrey Andare
v. Attorney General & 2 others, [2016]
eKLR, Petition No.149 of 2015, High Court
of Kenya at Nairobi Milimani Law Courts,
Constitutional and Human Rights Division,
at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/
view/121033/.
123. EU Directive 2013/40/EU, at Art. 7.
124. For example, quantum computing
is expected to both revolutionize
computing and unravel modern
encryption technology. See supra § 1 C,
box 1.3.
125. Andare, supra note 122.
126. See Kenya: Information and
Communications Act, Chapter 411A
§ 29, at https://www.unodc.org/res/
cld/document/ken/1930/informationand-communications-act_html/Kenya_
Information_and_Communications_
Act_2_of_1998.pdf.
127. Ibid.
128. Supra note 114, (stating “the provisions
of section 29 are so wide and vague
that they offend the requirements
with regard to law that carries penal
consequences and do not meet the
criteria set in Art. 24 of the Constitution
which provides instances when rights
can be limited), para. 80 & 99. Art.33(2),
Constitution of Kenya, (2010), at https://
www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20
constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf.
129. Ibid. (stating “Section 29 imposes a
limitation on the freedom of expression
in vague, imprecise and undefined terms
[…]”).
130. See supra § 2 B, case 2.6. See also infra §
4 A, case 4.1.
114. See, e.g., “How Blockchain Tech Could
Change the Way We Do Business,” BBC
News, (22 Jan. 2016), at http://www.bbc.
com/news/business-35370304.
Page 147 | Chapter 2 | End Notes
Table of Contents
Select target paragraph3
Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents