112. Ibid. As noted, the Silk Road case is highlighted in the Toolkit for a number of reasons. Ibid. More generally, it bears noting that “dark web” markets— where drugs, weapons, malware, toxic chemicals, stolen data and the like are traded—is unlikely to go away. Rather, as cyberspace continues to gain both commercial and social importance, the place for such dark markets is only likely to grow. Indeed, by all indications, that growth is very substantial: recently, two additional dark web marketplaces— AlphaBay and Hansa—were shut down by FBI-led, global police efforts. See Chris Baraniuk, “AlphaBay and Hansa Dark Web Markets Shut Down,” BBC News, (20 Jul. 2017), at http://www.bbc.com/ news/technology-40670010. In terms of both traffic and value, AlphaBay and Hansa dwarfed Silk Road: while Silk Road only had 14,000 listings for illicit items of various kinds when it was seized in 2013, the DoJ said that AlphaBay had more than 350,000 listings, with US$450m was spent via the marketplace between May 2015 and February 2017. Ibid. While the impact of shutting down AlphaBay and Hansa is unclear, there are indications that trade on several of the other dark web’s illegal markets has increased, though the sales of some goods appear to have been reduced. See, e.g., Leo Kelion, “Dark Web Markets Boom after Alphas Bay and Hansa busts,” BBC News, (1 Aug. 2017), at http://www.bbc. com/news/technology-40788266. The growing dark side of cyberspace is a matter with which society at large will— constructively and collectively—have to grapple; fighting cybercrime and assuring cybersecurity are central elements therein. See, e.g., Ronald Deibert, “The Growing Dark Side of Cyberspace (… and What to Do About It),” Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs, Vol. 1, Issue 2 (Nov. 2012), at http:// elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1012&context=jlia. For a provocative, fictional depiction of the role of cyber exchanges, see Jennifer Haley, “The Nether”, supra § 1 B, note 7. 113. Tamara Tabo, “United States v. The Internet: America’s Most Wanted May Look a Lot Like You,” AbovetheLaw.com, (12 Jun. 2015), at http://abovethelaw. com/2015/06/united-states-v-the-internetamericas-most-wanted-may-look-a-lotlike-you/ 115. Ibid. 116. See Don Tapscott & Alex Tapscott, “The Impact of the Blockchain Goes Beyond Financial Services,” Harvard Business Review (10 May 2016), at https://hbr.org/2016/05/the-impact-ofthe-blockchain-goes-beyond-financialservices (“where not just information but anything of value – money, titles, deeds, music, art, scientific discoveries, intellectual property, and even votes – can be moved and stored securely and privately. On the blockchain, trust is established, not by powerful intermediaries like banks, governments and technology companies, but through mass collaboration and clever code. Blockchains ensure integrity and trust between strangers. They make it difficult to cheat.”). 117. See, e.g., US Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970 (see USC Title 18, §§ 5311–5330 and 31 CFR Chapter X [formerly 31 CFR Part 103] (“Bank Secrecy Act” or “BSA”). 118. Ibid., at para. 71. 119. See, e.g., United Kingdom: Computer Misuse Act 1990, (criminalizing three acts: (1) Unauthorized access to computer material; (2) unauthorized access with intent to commit or facilitate commission of further offences; (3) unauthorized modification of computer material), at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/1990/18/contents. It should be noted that amendments to the Computer Misuse Act were introduced in the Police and Justice Act 2006, http://www. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/48/part/5/ crossheading/computer-misuse. 120. USC Title 18, § 1030(a)(6)(A) & (B) 121. Ibid., at para. 81. 122. A review of the global state of cybercrime legislation by the CoE found that only 70% of studied countries had legislation in place targeting the misuse of devices; dual use of devices was not considered, with focus being on the production of some specific devices; misuse of devices was found to be criminalized only in relation with illegal access or system interference. See Cristina Schulman, “The Global State of Cybercrime Legislation,” Workshop 1: Cybercrime legislation (Strasbourg: Octopus Conference, 6–8 Jun. 2012), at https://rm.coe. int/16802f240b. See also Geoffrey Andare v. Attorney General & 2 others, [2016] eKLR, Petition No.149 of 2015, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi Milimani Law Courts, Constitutional and Human Rights Division, at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/ view/121033/. 123. EU Directive 2013/40/EU, at Art. 7. 124. For example, quantum computing is expected to both revolutionize computing and unravel modern encryption technology. See supra § 1 C, box 1.3. 125. Andare, supra note 122. 126. See Kenya: Information and Communications Act, Chapter 411A § 29, at https://www.unodc.org/res/ cld/document/ken/1930/informationand-communications-act_html/Kenya_ Information_and_Communications_ Act_2_of_1998.pdf. 127. Ibid. 128. Supra note 114, (stating “the provisions of section 29 are so wide and vague that they offend the requirements with regard to law that carries penal consequences and do not meet the criteria set in Art. 24 of the Constitution which provides instances when rights can be limited), para. 80 & 99. Art.33(2), Constitution of Kenya, (2010), at https:// www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20 constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf. 129. Ibid. (stating “Section 29 imposes a limitation on the freedom of expression in vague, imprecise and undefined terms […]”). 130. See supra § 2 B, case 2.6. See also infra § 4 A, case 4.1. 114. See, e.g., “How Blockchain Tech Could Change the Way We Do Business,” BBC News, (22 Jan. 2016), at http://www.bbc. com/news/business-35370304. Page 147 | Chapter 2 | End Notes Table of Contents

Select target paragraph3

Connect to a paragraph
Connect to an entity
Disable highlights
Add to table of contents