Referenced in: § E. Jurisdictional Issues 1. Oxford English Dictionary. 2. Kim Soukieh, “Cybercrime–The Shifting Doctrine of Jurisdiction,” Canberra Law Review, Vol. 10 (2011), pp. 221–38. 3. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). The collective corpus of procedural law devoted to the matter determining the legal system and the law of jurisdiction applying to a given legal dispute is known as conflicts of laws at large, although (especially in civil law jurisdictions) those matters are often addressed in private and, to a lesser extent, in public international law. See, e.g., Robert C. Lawrence, III, International Tax and Estate Planning (3d ed. 1999), Ch. 1. The ability and means of a court of the forum jurisdiction to resolve conflicts of laws is in and of itself an exertion of jurisdiction. See ibid. For that and other reasons, the Budapest Convention does nothing more than allow, “When more than one Party claims jurisdiction over an alleged offence established in accordance with this Convention, the Parties involved shall, where appropriate, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.” Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 22.5 (emphasis added). See also Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 14, at para. 239. 4. It bears noting that while there are positive jurisdictional conflicts—where several states seek jurisdiction over the same crime—, negative ones, where no state claims jurisdiction, also exist. To limit the occurrence of the latter scenario for cybercrimes—which could potentially leave would-be plaintiffs without any recourse—, the Budapest Convention, for one, lists the bases on which a country may or must assert jurisdiction over a crime covered (Arts. 2–11), as well as obliging signatories to establish those acts as criminal offenses in their jurisdictions (Art. 22 et seq.). See Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32. Principles of sovereignty allows that Parties to the Convention are in no way limited in asserting jurisdiction over other crimes pursuant to their domestic law, and independent of the Convention. See, e.g., ibid., at Art. 22.4. 5. See §§ 2 C, 2 D & 3 C. 6. See § 3 D. 7. Brenner, supra § 1 B, note 2. Page 154 | Chapter 2 | End Notes 8. 9. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77–128, at http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/foundation/ documents/03Weber1918.pdf. Mark Landler, “A Filipino Linked to ‘Love Bug’ Talks about his License to Hack,” New York Times, (21 Oct. 2000), at http:// www.nytimes.com/2000/10/21/business/afilipino-linked-to-love-bug-talks-about-hislicense-to-hack.html. 10. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “Love Bug: The Virus That Hit 50 Million People Turns 15,” Motherboard, (4 May 2015), at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/lovebug-the-virus-that-hit-50-million-peopleturns-15. 11. Landler, supra note 9. 12. The basis for international public law is by and large built upon the notion of Westphalian sovereignty. See, e.g., Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization, Vol. 55, (2001), pp. 251–87. 13. See, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 22.1 et seq.,. 14. Korea: Criminal Act, (30 Dec. 2014) [hereafter, “Korean Criminal Act”], at http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanticorruptioninitiative/46816472.pdf, Art. 2. 15. See, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 22.1.b. 16. Ibid., at Art. 22.1.c. 17. Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10 Dec. 1982) UN Doc A/Conf.62/122, UN Reg. No I-31363, Part VII High Seas, § 1 General Provisions, Art. 87; see also, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 4., (“This Act shall apply to aliens who commit crimes on board a Korean vessel or Korean aircraft outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.”). 18. Ibid. See Warsaw Summit Communiqué, supra § 1 A, note 12. 19. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32. 20. ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra § 1 B, note 1, at 235–38; Brenner & Koops, “Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction,” p. 6. 21. See, e.g., 1999 Revision of the Model State Computer Crimes Code, § 1.03 (AE), http://www.crime-research.org/library/ Model.htm. 22. See, e.g., Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 4, at para. 233. 23. Ibid. 24. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, Seymour E. Goodman, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar et al., “A Proposal for an International Convention on Cyber Crime and Terrorism,” Hoover Institution, CRISP, CISAC & Stanford University (Aug. 2000), at http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/ sites/default/files/sofaergoodman.pdf. Transnational fraud, for example, has led to decisions by national courts assuming jurisdiction on the basis of any significant connection to the conduct involved. Among these are the states where a fraud was planned, where an effort to defraud was initiated, where individuals worked at implementing the fraud, where or through which communications were made that were intrinsic to the fraud, where the victims were located, and where the fraud had material and intended effects. The widespread recognition of fraud as criminal activity leads states readily to find jurisdiction over such activity, despite the significant relationship particular frauds may have to other states. They tend to assume that punishing fraud will be supported by other affected states, rather than opposed as violating their sovereignty. At the very least, leaving aside the heightened dangers posed by cybercrime, the same rationale that supports such a broad assertion of jurisdiction over fraud supports a similar assertion of jurisdiction over cybercrime. 25. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Arts. 2–11. 26. See, e.g., 1999 Revision of the Model State Computer Crimes Code, supra note 21; see also Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art. 22.1.d. 27. See Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 14, at para. 236. 28. Ibid. 29. See infra for discussions of dual criminality. Also, in order to avoid a case of negative jurisdiction, where no state claims jurisdiction, the Budapest Convention allows that the principle of nationality might be used to prosecute an offender acting in a “place outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State”. See Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 14. 30. Supra ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra § 1 B, note 1, at 237; see also, Korean Criminal Act, supra note 14, at Arts. 3 & 5. Table of Contents

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