Referenced in: § E. Jurisdictional
Issues
1.
Oxford English Dictionary.
2.
Kim Soukieh, “Cybercrime–The Shifting
Doctrine of Jurisdiction,” Canberra Law
Review, Vol. 10 (2011), pp. 221–38.
3.
See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d
279 (N.Y. 1963). The collective corpus of
procedural law devoted to the matter
determining the legal system and the
law of jurisdiction applying to a given
legal dispute is known as conflicts of
laws at large, although (especially in civil
law jurisdictions) those matters are often
addressed in private and, to a lesser
extent, in public international law. See,
e.g., Robert C. Lawrence, III, International
Tax and Estate Planning (3d ed. 1999),
Ch. 1. The ability and means of a court of
the forum jurisdiction to resolve conflicts
of laws is in and of itself an exertion of
jurisdiction. See ibid. For that and other
reasons, the Budapest Convention does
nothing more than allow, “When more
than one Party claims jurisdiction over an
alleged offence established in accordance
with this Convention, the Parties involved
shall, where appropriate, consult with a
view to determining the most appropriate
jurisdiction for prosecution.” Budapest
Convention, supra § 1 B, note 32, at Art.
22.5 (emphasis added). See also Budapest
Explanatory Report, supra § 1 D, note 14,
at para. 239.
4.
It bears noting that while there are
positive jurisdictional conflicts—where
several states seek jurisdiction over the
same crime—, negative ones, where
no state claims jurisdiction, also exist.
To limit the occurrence of the latter
scenario for cybercrimes—which could
potentially leave would-be plaintiffs
without any recourse—, the Budapest
Convention, for one, lists the bases
on which a country may or must assert
jurisdiction over a crime covered (Arts.
2–11), as well as obliging signatories to
establish those acts as criminal offenses
in their jurisdictions (Art. 22 et seq.). See
Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note
32. Principles of sovereignty allows that
Parties to the Convention are in no way
limited in asserting jurisdiction over other
crimes pursuant to their domestic law,
and independent of the Convention. See,
e.g., ibid., at Art. 22.4.
5.
See §§ 2 C, 2 D & 3 C.
6.
See § 3 D.
7.
Brenner, supra § 1 B, note 2.
Page 154 | Chapter 2 | End Notes
8.
9.
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 77–128,
at http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/foundation/
documents/03Weber1918.pdf.
Mark Landler, “A Filipino Linked to ‘Love
Bug’ Talks about his License to Hack,”
New York Times, (21 Oct. 2000), at http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/10/21/business/afilipino-linked-to-love-bug-talks-about-hislicense-to-hack.html.
10. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “Love
Bug: The Virus That Hit 50 Million People
Turns 15,” Motherboard, (4 May 2015), at
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/lovebug-the-virus-that-hit-50-million-peopleturns-15.
11. Landler, supra note 9.
12. The basis for international public law
is by and large built upon the notion
of Westphalian sovereignty. See, e.g.,
Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty,
International Relations, and the
Westphalian Myth,” International
Organization, Vol. 55, (2001), pp. 251–87.
13. See, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1
B, note 32, at Art. 22.1 et seq.,.
14. Korea: Criminal Act, (30 Dec. 2014)
[hereafter, “Korean Criminal Act”], at
http://www.oecd.org/site/adboecdanticorruptioninitiative/46816472.pdf, Art. 2.
15. See, e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1
B, note 32, at Art. 22.1.b.
16. Ibid., at Art. 22.1.c.
17. Convention on the Law of the Sea, (10
Dec. 1982) UN Doc A/Conf.62/122, UN
Reg. No I-31363, Part VII High Seas, §
1 General Provisions, Art. 87; see also,
e.g., Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B,
note 32, at Art. 4., (“This Act shall apply
to aliens who commit crimes on board a
Korean vessel or Korean aircraft outside
the territory of the Republic of Korea.”).
18. Ibid. See Warsaw Summit Communiqué,
supra § 1 A, note 12.
19. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note
32.
20. ITU Understanding Cybercrime, supra §
1 B, note 1, at 235–38; Brenner & Koops,
“Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction,”
p. 6.
21. See, e.g., 1999 Revision of the Model
State Computer Crimes Code, § 1.03 (AE), http://www.crime-research.org/library/
Model.htm.
22. See, e.g., Budapest Explanatory Report,
supra § 1 D, note 4, at para. 233.
23. Ibid.
24. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, Seymour
E. Goodman, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
et al., “A Proposal for an International
Convention on Cyber Crime and
Terrorism,” Hoover Institution, CRISP,
CISAC & Stanford University (Aug.
2000), at http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/
sites/default/files/sofaergoodman.pdf.
Transnational fraud, for example, has led
to decisions by national courts assuming
jurisdiction on the basis of any significant
connection to the conduct involved.
Among these are the states where a fraud
was planned, where an effort to defraud
was initiated, where individuals worked at
implementing the fraud, where or through
which communications were made that
were intrinsic to the fraud, where the
victims were located, and where the
fraud had material and intended effects.
The widespread recognition of fraud as
criminal activity leads states readily to
find jurisdiction over such activity, despite
the significant relationship particular
frauds may have to other states. They
tend to assume that punishing fraud will
be supported by other affected states,
rather than opposed as violating their
sovereignty. At the very least, leaving
aside the heightened dangers posed
by cybercrime, the same rationale that
supports such a broad assertion of
jurisdiction over fraud supports a similar
assertion of jurisdiction over cybercrime.
25. Budapest Convention, supra § 1 B, note
32, at Arts. 2–11.
26. See, e.g., 1999 Revision of the Model
State Computer Crimes Code, supra note
21; see also Budapest Convention, supra
§ 1 B, note 32, at Art. 22.1.d.
27. See Budapest Explanatory Report, supra §
1 D, note 14, at para. 236.
28. Ibid.
29. See infra for discussions of dual
criminality. Also, in order to avoid a
case of negative jurisdiction, where no
state claims jurisdiction, the Budapest
Convention allows that the principle of
nationality might be used to prosecute
an offender acting in a “place outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any State”. See
Budapest Explanatory Report, supra § 1
D, note 14.
30. Supra ITU Understanding Cybercrime,
supra § 1 B, note 1, at 237; see also,
Korean Criminal Act, supra note 14, at
Arts. 3 & 5.
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