agency systems with malicious code. 15.2.24.R.02. Rationale An effective defence is to strip and replace active addresses and hyperlinks with text only versions. 15.2.24.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:1749] Email servers SHOULD be configured to strip active addresses and URL’s and replace them with text only versions. 15.2.25. Preventing unmarked or inappropriately marked emails 15.2.25.R.01. Rationale Unmarked or inappropriately marked emails can be blocked at two points, the workstation or the email server. The email server is often the preferred location to block emails as it is a single location under the control of system administrators that can enforce the requirement for the entire network. In addition email servers can apply controls for emails generated by applications. 15.2.25.R.02. Rationale Whilst blocking at the email server is considered the most appropriate control there is an advantage in also blocking at the workstation. This approach adds an extra layer of security and will also reduce the likelihood of a data spill occurring on the email server. 15.2.25.R.03. Rationale For classified systems is it important to note that all emails containing classified information MUST be protectively marked. This requirement is outlined in Section 15.1 - Email Applications. 15.2.25.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): Confidential, Secret, Top Secret; Compliance: MUST [CID:1754] Agencies MUST prevent unmarked and inappropriately marked emails being sent to intended recipients by blocking the email at the email server, originating workstation or both. 15.2.25.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): Confidential, Secret, Top Secret; Compliance: MUST [CID:1755] Agencies MUST enforce protective marking of emails so that checking and filtering can take place. 15.2.25.C.03. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:1756] Agencies SHOULD enforce protective marking of emails so that checking and filtering can take place. 15.2.26. Blocking of outbound emails 15.2.26.R.01. Rationale Blocking an outbound email with a valid protective marking or endorsement (e.g. NZEO) that indicates the email exceeds the classification of the communication path, stops data spills. 15.2.26.R.02. Rationale Agencies may remove protective markings from emails destined for private citizens and businesses once they have been approved for release from the agency’s gateways. 15.2.26.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST [CID:1760] Agencies MUST configure systems to block any outbound emails with a protective marking or endorsement indicating that the content of the email exceeds the classification of the communication path. 15.2.26.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:1761] Agencies SHOULD configure systems to log every occurrence of a blocked email. 15.2.27. Blocking of inbound emails 15.2.27.R.01. Rationale Blocking an inbound email with a valid protective marking that indicates the email or its attachment exceeds the classification the receiving system is accredited to process will prevent a data spill from occurring on the receiving system. 15.2.27.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST [CID:1764] Agencies MUST configure email systems to reject, log and report inbound emails with protective markings indicating that the content of the email exceeds the accreditation of the receiving system. 15.2.27.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:1765] Agencies SHOULD notify the intended recipient of any blocked emails. 15.2.28. Undeliverable messages 15.2.28.R.01. Rationale Undeliverable or “bounce” emails are commonly sent by email servers to the original sender when the email cannot be delivered, often because the destination address is invalid. Because of the common spamming practice of spoofing sender addresses, this can result in a large amount of bounce emails being sent to an innocent third party. Sending bounces only to senders that can be verified via the Sender Policy Framework (SPF) or other trusted means avoids contributing to this problem and allows other government agencies and trusted parties to receive legitimate bounce messages. See also 15.2.15 - Sender Policy Framework. 15.2.28.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD [CID:1768] Agencies SHOULD send notification of undeliverable, bounced or blocked emails to senders that can be verified via SPF or other trusted means. 203 Version_3.5__January-2022

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