15.2.29. Automatic forwarding of emails
15.2.29.R.01. Rationale
Unsecured automatic forwarding of emails can pose a serious risk to the unauthorised disclosure of classified information, for example, a
system user may set up a server-side rule to automatically forward all emails to a personal email account. This can result in classified emails
being forwarded to the personal email account.
15.2.29.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:1771]
Agencies MUST ensure that the requirements for blocking unmarked and outbound emails are also applied to automatically forwarded emails.
15.2.30. Open relay email servers
15.2.30.R.01. Rationale
An open relay email server (or open mail relay) is a server that is configured to allow anyone on the Internet to send emails through the server.
Such configurations are highly undesirable as they allow spammers and worms to exploit this functionality to send emails through the server.
15.2.30.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:1774]
Agencies SHOULD disable open email relaying so that email servers will only relay messages destined for the agency’s domain(s) and those
originating from within that domain.
15.2.31. Email server maintenance activities
15.2.31.R.01. Rationale
Email servers perform a critical business function for many agencies; as such it is important that agencies perform regular email server
auditing, security reviews and vulnerability analysis activities.
15.2.31.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:1777]
Agencies SHOULD perform regular email server auditing, security reviews and vulnerability analysis activities.
15.2.32. Centralised email gateways
15.2.32.R.01. Rationale
Without a centralised email gateway it is exceptionally difficult to deploy Sender Policy Framework (SPF), DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM)
and outbound email protective markings verification.
Attackers will almost invariably avoid using the primary email server when sending malicious emails. This is because the backup or alternative
gateways are often poorly maintained with out-of-date blacklists and content filtering.
15.2.32.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:1780]
Where an agency has system users that send email from outside the agency’s network, an authenticated and encrypted channel MUST be
configured to allow email to be sent via the centralised email gateway.
15.2.32.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:1781]
Agencies SHOULD route email through a centralised email gateway.
15.2.32.C.03. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:1782]
Where backup or alternative email gateways are in place, additional email gateways SHOULD be maintained at the same standard as the
primary email gateway.
15.2.33. Transport Layer Security (TLS)
15.2.33.R.01. Rationale
Email can be intercepted anywhere between the originating email server and the destination email server. Email transport between
organisations and agencies is usually over the internet or other unsecured public infrastructure so it is important that email interception is
carefully managed and suitable controls applied. One effective measure is to use TLS to encrypt the email traffic between email servers.
15.2.33.R.02. Rationale
Enabling TLS on the originating and accepting email server will defeat passive attacks on the network, with the exception of cryptanalysis
against email traffic. TLS encryption between email servers will not interfere with email content filtering schemes. Email servers will remain
compatible with other email servers as IETF’s RFC 3207 specifies the encryption as opportunistic
15.2.33.C.01. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: MUST
[CID:1786]
Agencies MUST enable opportunistic TLS encryption as defined in IETF’s RFC 3207 on email servers that make incoming or outgoing email
connections over public infrastructure.
15.2.33.C.02. ControlSystem Classification(s): All Classifications; Compliance: SHOULD
[CID:1787]
Agencies SHOULD implement TLS between email servers where significant volumes of classified information are passed via email to other
agencies.
15.2.34. Sender Policy Framework (SPF)
15.2.34.R.01. Rationale
The Sender Policy Framework (SPF) is an open standard specifying a technical method to prevent sender address forgery.
An SPF-protected domain is less attractive to spammers and phishers because the forged e-mails are more likely to be caught in spam filters
which check the SPF record. Because an SPF-protected domain is less attractive as a spoofed address, it is less likely to be blacklisted by spam
filters and so is less disruptive to email traffic.
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