JIHADIST AND ETHNO-NATIONALIST TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM | ASSESSMENT Travel out of the conflict area in Syria and Iraq is not easy. In addition, most surviving jihad travellers are aware that they will be confronted by the law enforcement agencies, which is why they attempt to go underground or to travel on to third countries. The FIS is therefore not expecting a big influx of returning jihad travellers with links to Switzerland, but only isolated individuals. Some jihad travellers from Switzerland have married and have had children in the conflict area. It is therefore to be expected that possible returnees might bring previously unknown persons with them, possibly including minors. This will present new challenges to the authorities at all levels (legal issues, problems of long-term integration and security issues). It will probably take one or two more years until the extent of the threat posed by returnees can be assessed in a more precise way. The targeted exploitation of migration flows to Europe and Switzerland by ‘Islamic State’ or by former jihadist fighters will also remain a real issue. Polarisation can foster radicalisation Jihad-motivated attacks and migration movements, particularly in 2015, have contributed to a rise in tensions and to increased political polarisation in European societies. This is also true in Switzerland, but to a lesser extent. Such polarisation may exacerbate the nega- tive feelings prevailing in parts of the Muslim community that they are being oppressed and marginalised, and in this way contribute to radicalisation and increase the potential for violence. Salafist and jihadist groups are exploiting this polarisation accordingly. Turkish-Kurdish conflict carries risks The PKK has the capacity to stage demonstrations and other actions – including violent ones – at short notice in response to events connected with the conflict in Kurdish areas. Violent clashes between PKK supporters and Turkish nationalists and/or supporters of Turkish President Erdogan currently pose the main threat in Switzerland. Confrontations are generally the result of direct provocation. Turkish institutions and agencies (such as clubhouses, Turkish Airlines (THY) travel agencies and government offices), as well as centres and mosques attended by nationalist or Islamist Turks, are all potential PKK targets. The present state of emergency in Turkey means that travellers, wherever they come from, risk being turned away or arrested on arrival if there is even a slight suspicion of their being PKK members or supporting terrorism. This also applies to Gülen supporters. In addition, there is still a heightened risk of attacks in Turkey, particularly in the major cities. Limited significance of terrorist financing Switzerland as a financial centre does not play a key role in terrorist financing. Whilst there has been an increase in the number of transactions out of Switzerland and within Switzerland which are suspected of being used User with links to Switzerland shares a propaganda image from ‘Islamic State’. 46 SI TUATIO N R E P O RT 2018 | F I S

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